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 Abstract 
 
Political conflicts arise out of, or are at least nourished by, divisions and tensions 
in society over how resources are distributed between citizens and social groups. 
In the parliamentary arena, these conflicts are manifested by political parties rep-
resenting the interests of their voters. However, even though we may agree that 
political conflicts are essential for politics and democratic systems, there is no 
consensus on what political conflicts are, what causes conflict and what their 
effects are. This thesis develops a theoretical framework for political conflicts 
that is productive in relation to studying causes and effects of political conflicts 
in local governments. A multi-method approach is applied in the studies. The 
first three papers and a literature review that is included in the introductory text 
focus on causes of political conflicts. The literature review, as well as the first 
paper, centres on structural and organisational explanations. The literature re-
view focuses on the research question: How did Swedish local governments de-
velop into party politicised forms of government, with the first paper dealing 
with the research question: What are the causes of political conflicts identified by 
earlier scholars and what effects do they have on local politics? The second 
paper focuses solely on organisational explanations and examines the research 
question: How does the organisation of political systems affect how and where 
political conflicts are expressed? The third paper uses explanations at the indi-
vidual level and deals with the research question: How do ideology, partisanship 
and trust affect how political conflicts are perceived? The fourth and final paper 
focuses on the effects of conflicts and answers the research question: To what 
extent does party political conflicts affect the influence of political leaders? The 
findings show that there are at least two forms of political conflict of relevance 
for parliamentary arenas – political dissent and antagonistic behaviour – and that 
it is important to distinguish between them. They have different characteristics, 
are caused by different factors and produce different effects. Manifestations of 
political dissent clarify differences between political actors and are thus of great 
importance to a democratic system. However, an overinflated amount of antag-
onistic and disrespectful behaviour, on the other hand, will create a problematic 
political working environment. When antagonism turns ugly, democratic insti-
tutions and the actors working within them may lose their legitimacy.  
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1 
Politics and Conflict 
 
“Politics arises out of conflict, and it consists of the activities  
(…) by which conflict is carried on” 
Banfield & Wilson, 1963:7 
 
Political conflicts arise out of, or are at least nourished by, divisions and ten-
sions in society over how resources are distributed between citizens and 
social groups. Such divisions exist to a varying degree in all societies. In 
some societies conflicts are long lasting, run deep, and divide citizens into 
groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In others, there are fewer cleavages and the group-
ings on either side shift over time depending on the issue at hand (Banfield & 
Wilson, 1963: 33). The allocation of valuable resources leads to conflicts of 
interest between individual citizens and social groups. In the parliamentary 
arena, these conflicts are manifested by political parties representing the in-
terests of their voters. Political representatives are expected to use their man-
date to represent their voters in future conflicts.  
The overall aim of this thesis is to broaden our understanding of political 
conflicts by studying what conflict is and in what way it is related to other 
social phenomena. 
Conflicts are an inevitable part of politics and society, and have conse-
quently been studied within many fields of research. However, even though 
political conflict has been the focus of numerous studies, there is no consen-
sus on what the phenomenon actually is. Mack and Snyder even describe 
conflict as a “…rubber concept, being stretched and moulded for the purpose-
es at hand” (Mack & Snyder, 1957: 212). Earlier studies teach us that the 
phenomenon is complex and may take on many forms. Different fields of 
study focus on different aspects of conflict, use different definitions of what a 
conflict is and have different ideas on how it is expressed (Lan, 1997). One 
reason for the diversity of the field is, of course, that it is a complex social 
phenomenon that does not easily lend itself to explanation. But it is most 
likely also due to the fact that researchers can have very different conceptual 
understandings of what political conflict is (Coser, 1956). In order to learn 
more about political conflicts, a definition that encompasses the complexity 
of the phenomenon needs to be developed.  
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What decision-makers know and believe is partly determined by their organ-
isational context and position. Earlier scholars of democracy teach us that even 
though conflicts are essential for democracy, their role and character vary 
depending on how political and administrative systems are structured (Lijphart, 
1999). The political bodies and the administration are interconnected institut-
ions where the framework for how political conflicts are to be expressed and 
managed is established, thus defining how political decisions are to be imple-
mented. Political conflicts and their manifestation may vary depending on how 
we organise our administrative systems and the welfare state, its degree of 
centralisation and decentralisation. In a decentralised welfare state, such as 
Sweden, where the local level plays a vital role in the realisation of welfare ser-
vices, there is major interplay between politics and administration. This means 
that studies of the relationship between central and local government, local 
self-government, size of local government, degree of specialisation, political 
leadership, as well as the relationship between politicians and administrators, 
are all of importance for administrative research and for understanding policy-
making and politics. 
The literature on public administration includes studies that have described 
how public organisations manage conflicts (Simon, 1957; Lipsky, 1980). How-
ever, there is a lack of explicit attention to conflict (Lan, 1997), and when it is 
addressed the focus is generally on its negative or problematic aspects (Wolf & 
Van Dooren, 2018). According to Wolf and Van Dooren (2018), the negative 
view of conflict is most often based in a Weberian approach to public admin-
istration. From such a perspective, conflicts are appropriate during political dis-
cussions leading up to a decision. After politicians have agreed on a policy, the 
policy moves on to an implementation phase where public administrators neu-
trally execute what the politicians have decided. Although it is not news that re-
striction of political conflicts to a single phase is incorrect (Lipsky, 1980; 
Svara, 1985), the continuing influence of the Weberian model means that con-
flicts are still regarded as of little relevance for administrative research.  
There is no denying that there are negative or problematic aspects of con-
flicts and that they may have dire consequences. Conflicts are most often as-
sumed to block efforts to cooperate and to instigate political deadlocks. They 
can even be associated with increased animosity towards opponents (Barber 
& McCarthy, 2015; Hetherington, 2009), and when they escalate in a society 
it can, of course, result in damage, destruction and suffering. However, much 
human progress can be attributed to struggles among people, for example the 
raising of living standards and the furthering of equality. Conflict also fulfils 
vital social functions such as drawing members of a group together in soli-
darity, thus establishing group identities and fostering loyalty (Coser, 1956). 
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It can also be a source of human betterment (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2017), as 
well as preventing tunnel vision and stimulating innovation (Coser, 1956; 
Carnevale, 2006; Cuppen, 2011; Coppens, 2014). And for those worried about 
political apathy, conflict can signal engagement (Hajer, 2003; Mouffe, 2008) 
and thus serve as a reminder that people care about public issues. This suggests 
that there are positive sides to conflict as well. 
Political parties represent the conflicting interests and ideologies of their 
voters and of different social groups, and the conflict between the parties is at 
the heart of politics and of political systems at all tiers of government. The 
significance of political parties and party conflicts in contemporary Western 
democracies is so great that some even speak of party democracy, “partoc-
racy”, and party government (Katz & Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997). However, 
some scholars paint a bleak picture of the future for political parties, arguing 
both that voters are out of touch with parties (Achen & Bartels, 2016) and 
that parties have lost their relevance to voters (Mair, 2013). For example, 
parties are now used as platforms for political activities and engagement to a 
lesser extent, they suffer from a declining membership base, and they are 
finding it increasingly difficult to recruit electoral candidates. Voter volatility 
has also increased, with citizens now shifting their allegiances more frequent-
ly and regarding themselves as supporters of a particular party to a lesser ex-
tent. Moreover, Lipset and Rokkan observe that the political cleavages be-
tween the parties, with few but significant exceptions, reflect the structures of 
the 1920s (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 50), and it is uncertain how relevant these 
still are. Recent studies of Sweden also show that over time, political parties 
have grown more similar to each other in the eyes of both voters and political 
representatives, and that both groups would like the parties to present more 
polarised positions on policies (Hagevi, 2018). But even though the opinions 
of political parties are perceived to be closer than ever, their ability to cooper-
ate with each other is at an all time low (Lindvall et al., 2017). These devel-
opments may prove to be immense challenges for democratic systems as a 
whole and for the political actors working within the system. 
Political parties need to channel the central political conflicts of society into 
the political institutions. If this function is not performed satisfactorily, it could 
generate a political vacuum with ensuing frustration among citizens (Bjereld et 
al., 2018: 17ff). This brings the risk of political populists becoming the only 
political alternatives (Mair, 2013:18ff). Mouffe (2008) argues that democratic 
institutions and political parties need to overcome this vacuum and return social 
tensions and passions back into the political institutions and display political 
conflicts openly. However, even though we may agree that the link between 
political parties and citizens should be strengthened, and that political conflicts 
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are essential in this regard, more knowledge is needed in relation to party politi-
cal conflicts in order to learn how political parties can become relevant again. 
In turn, if political actors had more knowledge and a greater under-standing of 
the mechanisms behind party conflicts, some of the political tensions between 
political opponents might perhaps be mitigated, thus encouraging better under-
standing among political adversaries. 
The literature on democracy and political behaviour shows that earlier 
scholars have studied party political conflicts. For example, it is at the core of 
Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of democracy (Schumpeter, 1942) and of Anthony 
Downs’s economic theory of democracy (Downs, 1957). These are theories 
where democracy is regarded as a mechanism for competition with political 
actors competing against each other in a quest for votes (Manin, 1997). In 
this sense, democratic elections are a means to legitimise government and to 
hold rulers accountable to the people. However, not everyone agrees that po-
litical conflicts are desirable. Other models of democracy emphasise the 
importance of consensus and of cooperation. From such a perspective, it is 
important to endeavour to bridge conflicts and find common ground 
(Lijphart, 1999; Premfors, 2000). 
Several scholars have also tried to determine causes of party political 
conflicts in elected assemblies. Some studies have found that the political 
situation in the parliamentary arena is linked to diversity and social fragmen-
tation in a society (Aistrup, 2004; Koetzle, 1998; Sullivan, 1973), to the size 
of the democratic unit (Bäck, 2000; Gerring et al., 2015; Karlsson, 2013), to 
fiscal stress (Lantto, 2005), or that the presence of a protest party is a sign of 
societal conflict that the established parties have failed to channel (Erlingsson, 
2005). There is also a stream of literature suggesting that political compete-
tion and contestation stimulate political conflicts (Adams et al., 2004; Adams 
& Merrill, 2009; Downs, 1957; Ezrow et al., 2011; Schumacher et al., 2013). 
It is also highly likely that the inherent differences between individuals and 
among political actors in how political conflicts are assessed are due to dif-
ferences in how we perceive the social world (Huddy et al., 2013).  
In recent decades, there has been an increasing emphasis on the role of 
political leaders (Steyvers et al., 2008), and scholars have stressed the im-
portance of understanding the context of political leadership (Lowndes & 
Leach, 2004). Political conflicts are an inevitable part of this context and   
may have effects for the administration, political operations (Houlberg & 
Holm Pedersen, 2014), for relations between political actors, and for the 
ability of political leaders to exert influence (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). Po-
litical leaders are at the top of their parties and need to interact with repre-
sentatives of other parties and respond to their positions (John & Cole, 1999). 
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Political representatives are expected to use their party political mandate to 
represent their voters in political decision-making processes and in the parlia-
mentary arena. But even though political conflicts are an element of political 
processes, they could be viewed as a potential distraction or disturbance for 
political leaders. Political conflicts could block their ability to cooperate with 
other political actors and to direct administrative operations.  
A study like this, aimed at studying what political conflict is and in what 
way it is related to other social phenomena, demands units of analysis (differ-
ent political systems) where the indicators of political conflicts are as similar 
as possible. However, it is challenging to assess complex social phenomena 
such as political conflicts. This is partly due to differences in how we per-
ceive the social world, but it is also due to social and cultural differences be-
tween countries. For example, what may be seen as highly antagonistic in one 
country may be viewed as normal in another. However, studies at the local 
level within the same country overcome these issues, as differences in cultur-
al and legal contexts between cases are easier to control (John, 2006). The 
multiplicity of local political systems also allows for many kinds of statistical 
analyses, and even though European local authorities today are essentially units 
of representative democracy (Loughlin et al., 2012; Schaap & Daemen 2012; 
Egner et al., 2013), local politics has predominantly been studied from a per-
spective on politics where politicisation of local governments is associated with 
developments at national level (see for example, Sundberg, 1989). From this 
perspective, politicisation of local governments has been dependent upon 
national politics, and hence also – subordinated – to this tier of government 
(Forsell, 2014). A result of this is that studies of democracy and political 
conflicts have primarily focused on the national level, with the emphasis on 
national organisations and parties, and that local politics is an understudied 
phenomenon. Concomitantly, this means that a study of party conflicts at the 
local level would make an important contribution to broadening our under-
standing of local politics. 
In order to increase the potential to generalise findings from the local 
level to politics at the national level, it is necessary to find a case where party 
politics plays a major role in municipal governance. Sweden is such a case. 
Compared to other countries, Swedish local politics has a high level of party 
politicisation (Denters & Klok, 2013) and the system is based on parliamen-
tary principles (Skoog, 2011).  
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Aim and Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of political 
conflicts in general by developing a theoretical framework that will be pro-
ductive for studying causes and effects of political conflicts in local govern-
ments. In order to do this, it is necessary to have a background understanding 
of how Swedish local government became party politicised. However, as this 
history has not yet been written, it needs to be described in order to fulfil the 
aim of this thesis. It is also important to assess the implications of party pol-
itical conflicts for local governments as well as their normative aspects. 
Three main research questions, with related sub-questions, are derived from 
this aim: 
 
I. What is political conflict? 
- Is political conflict a uniform phenomenon or are there different 
forms of conflict? 
 
II. What causes party political conflicts in local politics? 
- How did Swedish local government develop into party politicised 
forms of government? 
- What are the causes of political conflicts and what effects do they 
have on local politics? 
- How does the organisation of political systems affect how and 
where political conflicts are expressed? 
- How do ideology, partisanship and trust affect how political 
conflicts are perceived? 
 
III. What are the effects of party political conflicts in local politics? 
- To what extent do party political conflicts affect the influence of 
political leaders? 
 
This thesis is based on data from a range of sources; a survey conducted in 
2012 among all local councillors in the 290 municipalities of Sweden and a 
comparative case study of three municipalities that is based on interviews 
with leading local politicians and administrators conducted in 2016, as well 
as minutes from assembly meetings in 2009 and 2016. 
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Outline 
The thesis is structured as follows: section 2 examines theoretical perspectives 
on political conflicts and discusses how they might relate to one another. After 
reviewing the work of earlier scholars and systematically categorising their de-
finitions and perspectives on what political conflict is, the section ends with a 
presentation of two forms of political conflicts that are theoretically derived. 
This section is part of answering research question number 1, i.e. what is politi-
cal conflict. Section 3 elaborates the research design and methodological con-
siderations of the thesis.  
Fulfilling the aim of the thesis and developing a theoretical framework that 
is productive for studying party political conflicts in local governments requires 
a background understanding of how Swedish local governments became party 
politicised. However, in the absence of such a historical account from this per-
spective, a portrayal is required in order to fulfil the aim of the thesis. A sys-
tematic historical review of the party politicisation of Swedish local govern-
ment is consequently presented in section 4. This section is also part of answer-
ing research question number 2, i.e. what causes party political conflicts in 
local politics, but it also serves as a presentation of the Swedish case. Section 5 
presents the findings of the papers included in the thesis. Section 6 discusses 
the contributions of the thesis. The structure of this section is based on the 
research questions at hand and the papers’ results are presented thematically ac-
cording to how their respective findings answer the research questions. Section 
7, which is the last and final section of the thesis, constitutes a discussion of the 
implications of the findings for local governments. This section, and the thesis 
as a whole, concludes with a discussion on the implications of political con-
flicts for democracy and its normative underpinnings. 
An overview of the titles, research questions and methods for each paper 
or study included in this thesis is presented on the following page.  
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2 
Conflict, Consensus and 
Contestation 
 
There are different models of democracy, each of which carry with them dif-
ferent perspectives on the role of political conflict in democratic systems. I 
will present these models in this section and discuss their views on conflict. I 
will then discuss whether, from a theoretical perspective, there are different 
forms of political conflict or if it is a uniform phenomenon. This section con-
cludes with a discussion of how political conflict is related to contestation be-
tween political parties. 
 
Perspectives on Political Conflict in Democracy 
The conflict- and consensually-oriented views on democracy are today asso-
ciated with Arend Lijphart’s two models of democracy: majoritarian and con-
sensual democracy (Lijphart, 1999). Although the distinction between the 
models has been critiqued (Coppedge, 2018), it remains widely used and ac-
cepted. Where majoritarian democracy is similar to majority rule, it has com-
petition at its core and the primary motive for this model of democracy is the 
importance of accountability. It is about being clear who is responsible and 
having the possibility to elect new leaders if voters are dissatisfied. Another 
vital component is the importance of an active opposition. It is the role of the 
opposition to formulate clear alternatives for voters, and for this reason it is 
important that the opposition openly displays the cleavages between the 
parties (Lijphart, 1999). The majoritarian model of democracy also enables 
the largest possible number of citizens to live under the rule they have chosen. 
Protagonists argue that the will of the majority is as close as we can get to the 
will of the people as a whole (Dahl, 2007: 213ff). 
If competition is essential to the majoritarian model of democracy, then re-
flection or mirroring is central to the consensual model (Lewin, 2002: 91). 
Arend Lijphart is an advocate of the consensual model. Theoretically, the con-
sensual model means that a majority should not monopolise political power. 
Lijphart argues that even though a consensual model of democracy accepts ma-
jority rule as a minimum requirement, the goal is to maximise the size of the 
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majority in order to get as wide participation as possible. Democracy in this 
sense is to realise the will of the people, not only the majority, but as many of 
the people as possible should have the possibility to influence the contents of 
policies, either directly or through elected representatives. The consensual 
model is also associated with striving for cross-party compromises, where party 
differences are toned down (Lijphart, 1999). 
The majoritarian model of democracy emphasises concentration of 
power, while the consensual model stresses division of power (Lijphart, 
1999). If, from a majoritarian perspective, democracy is tantamount to being 
responsive to the majority, then every division of power means that it is 
tougher to realise the will of the majority. Division of power is thus a step 
away from this ideal. Concentration of power also facilitates accountability, 
as it is clear where responsibility lies. Clear political alternatives enable 
voters’ choices on Election Day, and democratic accountability is muddled if 
political representatives avoid taking a stand on politicised issues (Lupu, 
2015). For similar reasons, division of power is in line with the consensual 
model. Division of power can force a majority to negotiate with minorities. 
The majority thereby needs to compromise and seek solutions across party 
lines. From a majoritarian perspective, it is not desirable to include the oppo-
sition in decision-making as it makes their role unclear (Lijphart, 1999). 
The two models of democracy are similar in that they are both in favour of 
having different political alternatives and that political leaders should represent 
the will of the people. This means that what separates them is not whether 
political conflict exists or whether it has a legitimate place in a democratic 
system, but how political conflicts are to be managed, with the majoritarian 
model embracing conflicts and displaying them openly, and the consensual 
model emphasising the bridging of conflicts through compromises.  
In contrast with these two models of democracy, a deliberative model of 
democracy discusses political conflicts more implicitly. It is a model that 
adopts features of both consensual and majoritarian democracy. It differs from 
representative democracy in that it is deliberation, not voting, that is the pri-
mary source of legitimacy for democracy. Some use the term when referring to 
deliberation between political representatives, while others use it solely when 
discussing decision-making by citizens. Two of its defining characteristics are 
that those who participate in democratic processes are open to changing their 
minds and that their preferences are the result of reflection and deliberation 
(Dryzek, 2002). Proponents of deliberative democracy argue that there is a 
greater opportunity for widespread consensus to emerge after deliberation has 
taken place, and that those who participate in democratic processes are also 
expected to become more considerate of what is best for society as a whole, not 
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only for themselves as individuals. Criticism of deliberative democracy often 
concerns the potential for the most skilled rhetoricians to sway opinion in their 
favour, and that it represses inherent differences and conflicts between individ-
ual social groups (Dryzek, 2002). 
Beyond these discussions on what role political conflicts play in demo-
cratic systems, there are also those who argue the opposite position – that 
conflicts are not an essential component for governing. Advocates of com-
munitarianism express resistance towards a neutral state and maintain that it 
should be abandoned in favour of a politics that works towards the “common 
good” (Kymlicka, 1990). In a society based on communitarian values, what is 
regarded as the common good is shaped by community and shared traditions 
(MacIntyre, 1981). For communitarians, there is an impetus towards unity 
(Dryzek, 2002), and the common good is not to be adjusted according to in-
dividual preferences; instead their preferences are to be gauged according to 
how well they fit with the values of a community. This means that to some 
extent the common good is given precedence over needs or claims by in-
dividuals (Sandel, 1998).  
 
What Is Political Conflict? 
Conflicts are an inescapable part of the social world and have thus been the 
object of study within various fields of research, including international re-
lations (see for example, Henderson, 1998), peace research (see for example, 
Galtung, 1969; Kreutz, 2010; Wallensteen, 2015), sociology (see for ex-
ample, Collins & Sanderson, 2015; Coser, 1956), political theory (see for 
example, Mouffe, 2008), planning science (see for example, Hillier, 2003; 
Pløger, 2004), organisation studies (see for example, Bélanger et al., 2015; 
Kelly et al., 2011; Pondy, 1967), etc. Whilst there have been numerous at-
tempts to define conflict, it is, however, hard to define as it is a complex social 
phenomenon that can refer to many different aspects. Additionally, even 
though scholars may use the same term, i.e. conflict, it is apparent when re-
viewing their work that they operationalise it in different ways. 
Some scholars use the term when referring to situations where there are 
difficulties in reconciling different interests or when there are differences of 
opinion or disagreements over objectives (Bush & Folger, 1994: 56; Gurr, 
1980; Pondy, 1967; Schmidt & Kochan, 1972). For example, researchers 
who study political parties often use conflict to signify ideological differ-
ences or disagreements on policies between political actors (see for example, 
Oscarsson, 1998). Others have used the term when referring to behaviour – 
where actors behave in a confrontational way to promote their interests and 
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attempt to block other actors from achieving their objectives (Deutsch, 1973; 
Fink, 1968; Mack & Snyder, 1957). Analytically, there are different char-
acteristics between, on the one hand, differences of opinions or disagree-
ments between political actors and, on the other hand, how actors behave 
towards each other. But despite this, it is common for scholars to use the term 
conflict without specifying the characteristic to which they are referring. 
There is also a tendency among researchers to confuse one form or aspect of 
conflict with another, or even to treat the different characteristics of conflict 
as a uniform phenomenon. Some have noted this tendency and stressed the 
need to differentiate between different forms of conflict (Blalock, 1989; 
Coser, 1956). As scholars use the term “conflict” while, often implicitly, re-
ferring to different aspects, there is no consensus on whether there are dif-
ferent forms of conflict, what causes conflict, or what the effect of conflict is. 
Moreover, conflicts also entail a set of actors and opponents. For exam-
ple, Coser argues that conflict “[…] is a struggle between opponents over 
values and claims to scarce status, power and resources” (Coser, 1956). 
Others argue that entering into conflict is to enter into a relationship – to 
establish opponents – even where there were none before (Mouffe, 2008). 
There are an infinite number of political actors that can be said to represent a 
position or interest that therefore may find themselves in conflict with actors 
representing an opposing interest. However, not all conflicts are reflected in 
the party system – they are not “party politicised”. Conflicts that are not party 
politicised may still be present in the parliamentary arena, but these conflicts 
may then be found within political parties rather than between parties. The 
focus of this thesis is on party political conflicts, meaning conflicts that are 
found between political parties or between the political majority and the 
opposition. Relationships between political parties in terms of political con-
flicts have long been objects of discussion for scholars (see for example, 
Attiná, 1990; Axelrod, 1970; Coleman, 1997; Hix et al., 2005; Kreppel, 2000; 
Patterson & Caldeira, 1988). However, these studies have not defined what 
they mean by the term political conflicts, instead they have primarily studied 
the relationship between parties in terms of perspectives such as party cohe-
sion, coalition formation, how parties relate to the ideological left/right di-
mension, etc. In order to study what political conflicts are and how they are 
expressed, there is a need to build on the knowledge obtained from earlier 
scholars, but also bring in new perspectives. 
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Two Forms of Political Conflict 
Despite it being common for earlier scholars to disregard the complexity of 
political conflicts, their work does indicate that both disagreements and the 
behaviour of political actors are of importance for understanding political 
conflicts. This means that in order to create a definition of political conflict 
that is productive for studying party political conflicts, it is necessary to dif-
ferentiate between different forms of conflict. Having reviewed the work of 
earlier scholars, I argue that it is reasonable to suggest that there are at least two 
forms of political conflict that may be of relevance when studying party politi-
cal conflicts – political dissent and antagonistic behaviour. Political dissent 
refers to the different positions which political actors take on political issues 
on a scale between agreement and dissent; antagonistic behaviour refers to 
the way political actors act towards one another on a gradual scale between 
harmony and antagonism in order to reach their goals. However, whether or 
not it is fruitful to use these two forms of political conflict for analysis is an 
empirical question. 
Political parties in western democracies were created to represent different 
political alternatives and programmes. From this perspective, the conflicts be-
tween political parties that entail disagreement over political principles and 
issues (compare Oscarsson, 1998) are referred to here as political dissent. The 
parties may disagree on political objectives and on what constitutes a good 
society, and the parties may also have similar objectives, but they have differ-
ing views on how these should be pursued (Bakker et al., 2012; DiMaggio et 
al., 1996). A high degree of political dissent between the parties means that 
they have positions on political issues that are theoretically a long way apart, 
whereas a low degree of political dissent means that their positions are similar 
to each other or that they may even be in consensus. The degree of dissent is 
not static and may vary over time and from one issue to another. Some issues 
may be peripheral to the political debate and are hence politicised less frequent-
ly by the political parties. Other issues may be closely related to a party’s ide-
ology or principles, and are therefore more easily politicised by the parties. 
Antagonistic behaviour refers to how the political actors perceive the cli-
mate among the parties and how they act towards each other. A high degree of 
antagonistic behaviour refers to acts of open critique of other political parties, 
an emphasis on their differences, and disrespectful strategic action to stop other 
actors from exerting political influence. In contrast, a low degree of antagonis-
tic behaviour means that the parties downplay party differences and endeavour 
to achieve harmony and cooperation across party lines (Lantto, 2005).  
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Are the two forms of political conflicts related? Policy-based studies on 
coalition formation reveal that there is a greater likelihood of cooperation 
between parties with similar positions on political issues. Conversely, parties 
that are further apart will have trouble cooperating (Adams & Merrill, 2009; 
Axelrod, 1970; Bäck, 2003a; Desposato, 2006; De Swaan & Rapoport, 1973; 
Olislagers & Steyvers, 2013). Proponents of this theory, for example De Swaan 
and Rapoport (1973), challenge assumptions that all parties are of equal inter-
est when it comes to cooperation or forming a coalition government. Instead, 
policy-based theories argue that it is parties with similar positions on policies 
that are more likely to collaborate or form a coalition government. At the 
core of the policy-based model is the conviction that it is policy decisions 
that are the primary motives for political parties, and that this is what char-
acterises representative democracy (Walther, 2017: 30ff). But, the dimension 
of antagonistic behaviour is a wider phenomenon: comprising the relation-
ship between all parties, not just the partners in a coalition. However, in the 
light of these studies, one could expect political dissent among political ac-
tors to be accompanied by an increase in antagonistic behaviour in terms of 
political work, but this effect is by no means automatic. It is possible that co-
operation, a low degree of antagonistic behaviour, is a product of a series of 
compromises and that the positions of the parties on policies have not 
changed. This means that cooperation can be compatible with political dis-
sent (Lantto, 2005: 32) in the same way as major political dissent does not 
necessarily lead to antagonistic behaviour. This could be due to the fact that 
political parties are unaware of their policy differences (Karlsson, 2003), or 
that they are aware of their inherent differences but endeavour to bridge them 
through cooperation or deliberation (Gutmann & Thompson, 1998). From 
this we learn that antagonistic behaviour may occur in political arenas, even 
though there is a low level of political dissent on policies. In such cases, the 
political debates are often filled with matters of formalities or with attempts 
to amplify minor differences between political parties (Lantto, 2005). 
The concepts of cooperation and consensus are often used synonymously 
in everyday language. However, there is an analytical difference between 
them. Consensus refers to a similarity of opinion or like-mindedness, while 
cooperation refers to behaviours such as joint action or collaboration. This 
means that it is possible for political actors to collaborate even when they 
experience a mutual lack of consensus, and it is also possible for political 
actors to have trouble cooperating even though their positions on political 
issues are not that far apart (Lantto, 2005). 
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In this thesis, the focus is on party political conflicts between political parties 
and between the ruling majority and opposition in Swedish local govern-
ments. However, all forms of political conflict can be observed in society, i.e. 
citizens, social groups, organisations and political parties can all have inter-
ests that conflict with the interests of others, they can have different opinions 
and behave in a more or less confrontational manner.  
 
Contestation Between Political Parties 
There are different perspectives in the scholarly literature on the role of 
political parties. On one hand, some stress the importance of the internal 
democracy of parties and the importance for party leaders to represent their 
parties rather than follow their own judgment in order for representative 
democracy to function (Müller & Strøm, 1999). On the other hand, there are 
those who consider contestation between parties to be sufficient for democ-
racy to function (Schumpeter, 1942). According to the first tradition, political 
parties should represent the policy preferences of their voters, and according 
to the second tradition, parties should maximise their power and influence. 
From this emerges a concept that is related to political conflict and to the 
different models of democracy – contestation. It is central to representative 
democracy and in this perspective democracy is realised through contestation 
or competition between political parties and leaders in their quest to max-
imise their votes for a forthcoming election. Schumpeter argued that democ-
racy is a mechanism to create a contest between political representatives. 
Downs is of a similar mind, arguing that both political representatives and 
voters are rational actors, putting their self-interest as objective and making 
rational choices between different alternatives in order to maximise their in-
terests. For political parties, the objective is vote maximisation and for 
voters’ the objective is the fulfilment of their material interests, which are 
usually their economic interests (Downs, 1957; Lewin, 2002: 88). The level 
of contestation is low when a dominant party captures most of the votes and 
seats. Conversely, contestation is at a high level when there are more chal-
lengers than there are available seats. Shifts of power are common, leading to 
a tight race among political parties for seats (Gerring et al., 2015).  
Studies on electoral contestation often argue that their focus is the degree 
of political conflict between political parties. They do this by studying distri-
bution of seats between political parties, which may affect what policies 
parties deliver (see for example, Adams et al., 2004; Adams & Merrill, 2009; 
Downs, 1957; Ezrow et al., 2011; Gerber & Lewis, 2004; Schumacher et al., 
2013). From the perspective of this thesis, contestation and conflict are 
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related phenomena but analytically separate, where contestation refers to the 
degree of competition between political parties in a political system. Contes-
tation is thus not a form of conflict – though it may affect political conflicts, 
for example, how parties behave towards each other and what policies they 
might deliver. 
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Design and Methodology 
 
This thesis is based on four papers: three articles and one book chapter. The 
papers all focus on the same topic – political conflicts – but on different levels 
of analysis, and they are answers to different research questions. Where paper 1 
focuses on the causes of party conflicts at both organisational and structural 
level, paper 2 focuses on how the organisational structure has an influence 
where party conflicts are expressed, paper 3 focuses on what influences indi-
viduals’ perceptions of political conflict, and paper 4 focuses on effects at the 
municipal level of party conflicts on the influence of local political leaders (or-
ganisational level) (see Table 1, p. 8). This section presents the research design 
and methodology. 
 
Why Study Swedish Local Governments? 
In order to increase the potential to generalise findings from the local level to 
politics at the national level, it is necessary to find a case where party politics 
plays a major role in the governing of municipalities. As Swedish local 
governments are genuinely party politicised (Denters & Klok, 2013), Sweden 
is such a case. Moreover, in an international comparison Sweden has large mu-
nicipalities with extensive political organisations as well as major political re-
sponsibility for welfare services (Hesse & Sharpe, 1991; Sellers & Lidström, 
2007). The local governments in Sweden manage issues across the whole 
political spectrum and are responsible for service provision at all stages of its 
citizens’ lives, from childcare to elderly care. This means that the same lines 
of conflict that can occur between political actors at national level endure at 
local level as well and that the work within the local public administration 
affects the lives of practically all Swedes. 
Swedish municipalities are governed by an assembly, council committees 
and an executive board. The assembly consists of at least 21 members, with the 
exact number of members related to the number of local residents entitled to 
vote. The members of the assembly are directly elected, but nominated by the 
political parties. The assembly decides on principal issues or matters of great 
importance for the municipality. The executive board is often referred to as the 
“government” of the municipality (Montin, 2015). An informal practice of ma-
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jority rule has been established in Swedish local governments and the political 
system is based on parliamentary principles. This version of informal majority 
rule is sometimes referred to as “quasi-parliamentary democracy” (Bäck et al., 
2000), which means that after local elections, winning parties form a ruling ma-
jority in all municipalities. The ruling coalitions, which can vary greatly in size 
and composition, normally govern the municipality for the entire mandate pe-
riod. The members of the executive board are proportionally elected by the 
council according to the principle of assembly government, which means that 
the board comprises members of both the majority and the opposition. The 
chair of the board – the Swedish equivalent of a mayor – invariably represents 
a party in the ruling majority, as do the chairs of the council and council com-
mittees (Bäck, 2003b; Skoog, 2011; Karlsson, 2006). The main task of the ex-
ecutive board is to direct and coordinate municipal activities as well as to su-
pervise the activities of the council committees and municipal enterprises 
(Montin, 2015).  
In addition, Swedish municipalities have long been subject to policy 
shifts where various organisational changes have succeeded each other. The 
organisation of local government in Sweden is based on different institutions 
with different organisational functions. The Local Government Act (kom-
munallagen) regulates relations between these institutions, but nowadays this 
law leaves the field open for municipalities to structure their own organ-
isations. This has also led to a great variation in how Swedish municipalities 
have chosen to structure their organisations. However, even though the or-
ganisational structure differs, they all share the same system of party-based 
representative democracy (Montin, 2015). Using the Swedish municipalities 
as cases enables conclusions to be drawn about the conditions in different in-
stitutional arrangements that affect political conflicts. 
A commonly argued difference between democracy at local and national 
levels is that the local level is dominated by consensus and the national level is 
characterised by party conflicts and polarisation. From a historical standpoint, 
Swedish local politics was indeed characterised by consensual democracy until 
the 1950s and 1960s. However, there has subsequently been a gradual increase 
in party polarisation and local politics has now adopted ideals of majority rule 
and moved away from the ideals of consensual democracy that traditionally 
dominated local democratic practices (Gilljam et al., 2010a; Lantto, 2005). 
There is also now a great variation in degrees and forms of political conflict 
among Swedish municipalities (Karlsson & Skoog, 2014). 	
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Studying Political Conflicts 
Data on political conflicts is scarce and scholars interested in the phenomenon 
thus often use data such as election results, distribution of mandates between 
parties and frequency in shifts of power. However, such data is more likely to 
be related to the level of competition or contestation between political parties 
(as in paper 3) than to actual party political conflicts. Conflict and contes-
tation are related phenomena, but theoretically distinct from one another. 
Where contestation refers to mandate distribution or starting position for po-
litical parties and is therefore closely related to Downs’s theory on vote 
maximisation and the median voter hypothesis (Downs, 1957), political con-
flicts refer to the stances taken by political actors in relation to parties’ poli-
cies and behaviour, which can be affected by contestation but is analytically 
distinct. 
A fertile approach is to base estimations of political conflicts on subjec-
tive assessments held by the actors (see for example, Bäck, 2000; Lantto, 
2005). This can be done through surveys and interviews, both of which have 
advantages over other indicators commonly used for studying views and 
perceptions of political actors. In particular, they provide information report-
ed by the actors themselves. This means that researchers need to rely to a 
lesser degree on indirect information such as voting data that may be prob-
lematic if one is interested in studying views and ideas held by political ac-
tors (Bailer, 2014). 
Earlier scholars have sometimes used conflict markers and voting data 
from parliamentary arenas in relation to party behaviour and party relations. 
Conflict markers refer to specific behaviour during parliamentary meetings 
such as alternative claims, reservations, call for votes, etc. This form of anal-
ysis is sometimes referred to as “roll-call analysis”, and it has a long history 
within political science (Carroll & Poole, 2014). It started with analysis of 
voting data from the American Congress in the 1950s and quickly spread 
within the social sciences. Even though it is still frequently used in American 
studies and in studies of the European Parliament, with some exceptions this 
tradition seems to have stalled in Sweden since the 1970s (Lindvall et al., 
2017). Studying conflict markers provides several benefits, such as the op-
portunity to study behaviour without attending the meeting in question, and 
to have a unit of analysis that is readily comparable and easily accessible. It 
also enables the researcher to get an indication of whether there have been 
any change in conflict levels over time. However, as conflict markers teach 
us little about the compromises and agreements that political parties make 
outside the parliamentary arena, this means that there is reason to be cautious 
regarding drawing conclusions on political conflicts solely based on such 
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markers. It is also problematic to use such information when studying views 
and ideas held by political actors. On the other hand, conflict markers and 
voting data can support or complement findings in interviews or other forms 
of data (as in paper 2). 
 
A Multi-Method Approach 
This thesis employs a multi-method approach in which I combine quanti-
tative and qualitative methods for analysis depending on the research ques-
tion at hand. The main empirical data for this thesis consists of subjective 
assessments (survey data and interviews) of political conflicts held by po-
litical actors. In one of the papers the subjective assessments have been 
complemented with a more objective measure of political conflicts (conflict 
markers). The quantitative analysis of survey data consists of multiple-OLS 
regression analyses when the aim is to study political conflicts at a structural 
or municipal level (papers 1 and 4), and when the aim is to study perceptions 
at an individual level a fixed-effects linear multilevel regression model is 
used in order to distinguish individual factors from factors at municipal level 
(paper 3). As some of the individual independent variables may persist at 
both individual and contextual level, aggregated versions of the variables (i.e. 
for gender, the proportion of women in the council, for socialist ideology, the 
proportion of socialists in the council, etc.) have been included in the analysis 
as well (compare Eriksson, 2007).1 Additionally, all of the causes of political 
conflicts that are proposed in paper 1 are included in the multi-level analysis 
of paper 3 and this analysis confirms the results of paper 1. Both interviews 
and conflict markers are used when the aim is to study how organisational 
structure affects where and how conflicts are expressed (paper 2). Combining 
interviews and conflict markers in this manner enables me to not rely solely 
on indirect information when studying subjective assessments held by 
political actors, but at the same time to utilize conflict markers in a way that 
complements such assessments. 
Furthermore, the null model analysis included in paper 3 shows that 8 per 
cent of the variation in perceived political dissent is found between the 290 mu-
nicipalities in which representatives are clustered (intraclass correlation), while 
92 per cent of the variation is found among individual representatives. About 
21 per cent variation in perceived antagonistic behaviour is found at the mu-
nicipal level, while 79 per cent is found among individual representatives. The 
                                                                  
 
1 I would like here to extend a special thank you to Katarina Roos, senior lecturer in the Department of 
Political Science, Umeå University, for her advice regarding the multi-level analysis and how to control for the 
independent variables at municipal level. Her guidance has been invaluable for the analysis in paper 3.   
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variation among representatives within the municipalities is thus much greater 
than the variation between municipalities. This means that it is important to 
study political conflicts at structural, organisational and individual level in 
order to get a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. 
This is a multi-method approach where techniques for data gathering and 
analysis are combined from at least two methodological traditions (Seawright, 
2016). A common argument for multi-method research is to apply “triangula-
tion”, which means asking the same question but answering it using different 
methods. The perspective in this thesis is rather to integrate than to triangulate, 
meaning that all the articles focus on the same topic, but both the methods and 
the research questions vary. This is in line with Seawright (2016), who argues 
that qualitative and quantitative methods can-not be used to answer the same 
question as there are fundamental differences between the methods “…and so it 
is essentially useless to ask whether the answers are the same”. Instead, the idea 
is to use each method to answer questions for which it is especially suitable.  
 
The Survey – KOLFU 
Data used in papers 1, 3, and 4 derives from a survey of all councillors in the 
290 municipalities of Sweden: the KOLFU survey that was carried out in 
2008-2009 and 2012-2013. KOLFU stands for “Kommun- och Landstings-
fullmäktigeundersökningen”, which translates to the Local and Regional 
Councils Survey. KOLFU was conducted for the first time in the winter of 
2008/2009 and for the second time in the winter of 2012/2013. There were 
9,890 respondents in 2008 and 10,491 in 2012. A team of researchers at the 
University of Gothenburg conducted both KOLFU 2008 and KOLFU 2012. 
The surveys included questions regarding social background, opinions on polit-
ical issues, views on democratic procedures, and the political work in their re-
spective municipalities/counties. The surveys were mainly carried out electron-
ically, however a postal survey was sent to those councillors who either did not 
have an active e-mail address or who specifically requested it. The response 
rate was 70% for KOLFU 2008 and 79% for KOLFU 2012. The high response 
rates increase the potential for a good representativeness of the survey in rela-
tion to the total number of councillors in Sweden. Overall, there are no major 
differences between the response rates of representatives from different polit-
ical parties and the gender balance is also closely matched with the total 
number of councillors. The responses are also very well distributed geographi-
cally (Karlsson & Gilljam, 2014). The response rate is high in practically every 
municipality, which means that the survey can be used for analysis of relations 
and attitudes at municipal level.  
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Measuring Political Conflicts 
There are several challenges to overcome for those interested in measuring 
political dissent and antagonistic behaviour between political actors. In a book 
chapter from 2014 (“Politiska konflikter i svenska kommuner” by David 
Karlsson and Louise Skoog in the book “Svenska politiker”), we discussed 
these challenges and explored different ways of operationalising political con-
flicts based on survey data. As the discussions and results of this preliminary 
study were used as a foundation for methodological considerations in the pa-
pers included in the thesis (for example choice of indicators for the two forms 
of conflict), these considerations are of major relevance here as well. 
 
Political Dissent 
In the book chapter (Karlsson & Skoog, 2014), we discussed the differences 
between subjective and objective estimations of levels of political conflicts, 
where a fundamental issue is that the actors themselves have different sub-
jective perceptions of conflict and are not in agreement regarding what is a 
major or a minor conflict. Some of the most heated conflicts on policies oc-
cur between political actors that might seem to an outside observer to have 
relatively similar positions. And in addition, if the issues on which the con-
flicts are focused are of symbolic significance, then the disagreements can be 
perceived to be even greater.  
For example, with regard to objective measures of political dissent, we 
used the KOLFU survey to estimate what positions political representatives 
have on 8 different political issues. This information was used to generate an 
index, which constituted the basis for an objective measurement of how opin-
ion was distributed for each municipality, between all political parties and be-
tween the majority and the opposition. For each political issue, we used the 
average deviation from the median party’s position to estimate dissent be-
tween the political parties (compare Karlsson, 2013b). We also estimated the 
differences for each political issue between representatives of the majority 
and of the opposition in each municipality. Similar patterns emerged when 
comparing political dissent in relation to the 8 different political issues be-
tween, on the one hand, the political parties, and on the other hand, the po-
litical majority and the opposition. It is in issues regarding privatisation and 
taxes where the differences between left and right wing parties are the great-
est, and the same goes for differences between the majority and the opposi-
tion. It is only with regards to the migration issue where differences between 
the parties are greater than between the majority and the opposition. It is like-
ly that this is caused by the presence of the Sweden Democrats, a nationalist 
populist party that is in opposition in every municipality where they have 
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seats in the council. Notably, there was a strong correlation between levels of 
dissent between political parties on the one hand, and the level of dissent be-
tween majority and opposition on the other hand, revealing that a sizeable 
portion of the dissent between the political parties is captured by the dissent 
between the political majority and the opposition (Karlsson & Skoog, 2014). 
However, using an index of this kind has its limitations. The questions in 
the survey have a general or principal characteristic, and there are of course 
important differences between parties in a municipality that a measurement 
of this kind cannot apprehend. We therefore also used the question in KOLFU 
2012 where the political representatives assessed how great or small the po-
litical differences are between the main political opponents in their munici-
pality; the majority and the opposition. This gave us a subjective estimation 
of degree of political dissent for each municipality. Moreover, we found a 
clear and statistically significant correlation between the objective and sub-
jective estimations of conflict. However, it was only possible to explain a 
limited amount of the subjective estimations of dissent through the objective 
measures (Karlsson & Skoog, 2014). This clearly showed that respondents 
also based their assessments of political differences on factors other than the 
political issues included in the index. It is the subjective assessment of politi-
cal dissent between majority and opposition that have been used in the fol-
lowing papers that are included in this thesis. 
 
Antagonistic Behaviour 
The optimal way to estimate antagonistic behaviour in a political system would 
be to base estimations regarding confrontational or cooperative behaviour on 
assessments created from independent observations, such as conflict markers, 
roll-call analysis or patterns of friendship/socialisation between represen-
tatives from different parties. However, as observations of this kind are not 
accessible on the sort of scale that would be required for statistical analyses 
across all municipalities, we need to rely on information provided by the 
political representatives themselves. Several questions were asked in the 
KOLFU survey regarding the relationship between political parties and the 
representatives of different parties. Two questions are related to the objective 
(rather than subjective) behaviour of the politicians. On the personal or private 
side, they responded to a question regarding whether they had friends in other 
political parties, and on the professional side, they answered a question regard-
ing the extent to which they consulted with representatives from other parties 
when formulating political proposals. In the book chapter from 2014, the 
results showed that 38 per cent of local representatives state that one of their 
closest friends is a representative of another political party. Overall, politi-
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cians of the centre-right parties and the Green Party (Miljöpartiet) have more 
friends in other parties (40-49 per cent) than representatives of the Social 
Democrats and Left Party (32-35 per cent). The Sweden Democrats have the 
lowest proportion of friends in other parties (23 per cent) (Karlsson & Skoog, 
2014). When it comes to the responses to the question of how often politicians 
consult with politicians from other parties when formulating their political pro-
posals, there are similarities with the results relating to friendships. The centre-
right parties consult with others to a higher extent (40-34 on a scale from 0 to 
100) than do representatives from the Social Democrats, Green Party and Left 
Party (29-38). The Sweden Democrats consult with representatives of other 
parties least of all (17).  
The questions regarding friendship and counsel describe behaviour and 
relations between political parties. However, there are obvious flaws in these 
measurements. For most politicians, there are political parties that hold neigh-
bouring positions to their own party; and cooperation and friendship with rep-
resentatives of those parties is not necessarily a measurement of what their rela-
tionships are like with political parties in general. And as it is not uncommon 
for smaller political parties to only have a handful of representatives in some 
municipalities, it is not surprising if they coordinate their efforts with repre-
sentatives of political parties that have positions on political issues that are 
similar to their own party. These measurements are interesting and address one 
aspect of antagonistic behaviour, but as they are unreliable they have not been 
used in the papers within this thesis. 
Respondents were also asked in KOLFU 2012 to make their own as-
sessment of the relations between the political parties and between the ma-
jority and the opposition in their municipality. The question was: “Is politics 
[in your municipality] primarily characterised by consensus or by party con-
flicts?”, with the degree of antagonistic behaviour in each municipality mea-
sured as the mean value of the councillors’ responses. The councillors re-
sponded on an eleven point scale and the answers were coded on a scale from 
0 (primarily consensus) to 100 (primarily party conflicts). The mean value 
among all the municipalities is 46 and the municipalities with the highest and 
lowest perceived antagonistic behaviour were Älvdalen (87) and Ydre (14). 
In connection with the question on overall level of antagonistic behaviour in 
their municipality, the politicians also responded to a similar question re-
garding the council committee(s) where they have assignments. The mean 
value on the same scale was 30, illustrating that the level of conflict in their 
respective council committee is clearly perceived to be lower than in the mu-
nicipality overall (confirming findings from paper 2). 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 25 
Furthermore, the politicians were also asked to consider the statement “Rela-
tions between the majority and the opposition [in your municipality] are 
good”. This relates to how politicians perceive the relationship between the 
parliamentary alternatives. They answered the question on a scale from 0 
(Entirely incorrect statement) to 10 (Entirely correct statement). This was re-
coded on a scale from 0 to 100, with the mean value of the relationship be-
tween the majority and the opposition in Swedish municipalities according to 
this measurement being 53. Responses to this question reveal a difference be-
tween politicians belonging to the majority (59) and the opposition (46), mean-
ing that politicians in the majority are more satisfied with the relationship 
than politicians in opposition (in line with findings from paper 3) (Karlsson 
& Skoog, 2014). 
Regarding correlations between different ways of estimating antagonistic 
behaviour, the results in the book chapter showed a positive and significant 
correlation between friendship and the exchange of counsel between political 
parties. However, there were no correlations between these estimations and 
how beneficial the politicians perceives the relationship to be between major-
ity and opposition or between the political parties in general, indicating that 
friendships are formed over party lines regardless of the overall political 
climate in a municipality. The results also showed that there is a very strong 
correlation between what politicians perceive the relationship to be like be-
tween, on the one hand, the majority and the opposition, and the overall po-
litical climate on the other hand, indicating that these two measures of per-
ceptions to a great extend measure the same thing – that politicians make no 
great distinction between antagonistic behaviour in their municipality in 
general and between the majority and the opposition in particular (Karlsson 
& Skoog, 2014). The indicator for antagonistic behaviour that is used in the 
following papers included in this thesis is local council members’ perception 
of the overall political climate. 
 
Comparative Case Studies 
There are different ways to learn about a phenomenon. It is possible to study a 
large number of cases and then focus on a small number of select dimensions, 
or study a few selected cases and then have a broader focus. The analysis in 
paper 2 is based on a comparative case study, meaning that a few selected 
cases were chosen for this study. Case studies can never be representative of 
all cases in a statistical sense, which means that the cases chosen cannot re-
present all details of the population as a whole. However, the ambition or un-
derlying logic of case studies is instead to draw conclusions or to find aspects 
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that are relevant for a theory (Gerring, 2017). Three municipalities were ex-
amined in paper 2 and the selection of cases was based on the logic of a 
most-similar cases design. This means that the municipalities selected were 
chosen because they are as similar as possible in terms of potential influ-
encing factors, except when it comes to the phenomenon of interest, i.e. or-
ganisational structure, where they vary. This design enables many of the in-
dependent variables that could influence the phenomenon studied, i.e. size of 
demos or type of political rule, to be kept constant (Gerring, 2017; Peters, 
1998). As representatives of different organisational structures, the munici-
palities included have a high, and low, degree of horizontal specialisation 
(i.e. number of council committees). In other aspects the cases are as similar 
as possible. For instance, they are of similar size (around the median pop-
ulation for Swedish municipalities) and have similar tradition of political rule 
(similar composition of the political majority and oppositional parties). A 
comparison of municipalities with different organisational structures enables 
conclusions to be drawn on how the structure affects where and how political 
conflicts are expressed. Additionally, minutes from Assembly meetings have 
been collected from two points in time (2009 and 2016) for all the munici-
palities included, and most of the interviewees have also held leading po-
sitions in their municipalities for at least a decade, which has also enabled 
comparisons across time. 
A common bias in case selection is that cases are often selected due to their 
historical importance or because of their accessibility (Bennett & Elman, 
2006). However, for a study of local governments in Sweden, the bias con-
cerning accessibility (i.e. that our ability to study a phenomenon is limited to 
what we have access to) is relatively low. All municipalities in Sweden are 
subject to the Transparency Act (offentlighetsprincipen), which means that 
they have a high degree of transparency and that most of what they do is ac-
cessible to the public. Furthermore, the focus was not on finding historically 
important cases, but rather to find municipalities that in one way or another 
can be said to represent average Swedish municipalities and thereby increase 
the validity of the study. 
 The analysis in this study is based on both documents and interviews. 
Firstly, minutes from all assembly meetings during 2009 and 2016 for all 
three municipalities have been used in order to study antagonistic behaviour 
in the assembly. In total, 668 matters have been analysed, with different 
forms of antagonistic behaviour, so called conflict markers, noted for every 
matter during the years selected. This enables a comparison across munici-
palities as well as over time. 2009 was chosen, as it was the year before 
Municipality C removed their council committees. 2016 was chosen as it is 
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the same year as the interviews were conducted. 2009 thus serves as an im-
portant point of comparison in drawing conclusions as to whether there has 
been a change to the behaviour in the assembly and, if so, the direction in 
which such a change has taken place. For every decision-making matter in 
the minutes, the focus has been on whether it gave rise to so-called conflict 
markers. The classification of the markers was such that each alternative 
claim, reservation and call for vote has been noted in a spreadsheet. If the 
same alternative claim or a reservation has been made by several councillors 
or by entire parties, this has also been noted.  
Interviews were also conducted with 11 local politicians and chief exec-
utive officers from three municipalities. The interviews were semi-structured, 
meaning that some of the questions and topics were decided on beforehand, 
but there was also an opportunity to ask supplementary and follow-up ques-
tions. The interviews lasted between one and two hours. An interview guide 
was used, with the questions concerning themes generated from the theoret-
ical framework. This means that a range of questions was asked regarding 
their background, how they would characterise the political culture of their 
municipality, the relationship between the political parties (as well as be-
tween the majority and opposition), whether this relationship varies in the 
different institutional arenas of the municipalities, etc. The interviews were 
transcribed, resulting in hundreds of pages of text. This material was then 
analysed in the software program NVivo where the material was structured 
into codes. The codes were based on the theoretical framework and research 
questions on which paper 2 focused. 
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4 
Party Politicisation of Swedish 
Local Governments 
 
In this section I will present a systematic review of how Swedish local govern-
ments developed from being non-partisan arenas based on deliberation towards 
an informal majority rule based on parliamentarian principles. This historical 
review will serve as a presentation of the Swedish case and contributes to an-
swering research question number two: what causes political conflicts in local 
politics? Scholars have previously studied the history of Swedish munic-
ipalities and local politics from various perspectives, for example dynamics of 
local communities and political culture (Aronsson, 2001), municipal reforms 
(Aronsson et al., 2002; Erlingsson et al., 2010; Strandberg, 1995; Wångmar, 
2003), construction of the welfare state (Ekström von Essen, 2003), as well as 
forms of political governance (Bäck, 2003a; Wångmar, 2006). These perspec-
tives are highly relevant to understanding political conflicts in local politics and 
they are related fields. However, as of yet there is no systematic historical re-
view focusing on party politicisation and political conflict, which means that 
although this section is descriptive and based on the work of other researchers, 
it nevertheless brings something new to the field of research on Swedish mu-
nicipalities. 
 
Time Line and Reforms 
The first Swedish Local Government Act (Kommunallagen) was passed in 
1862, laying the foundation for both the current municipal system and for 
local self-government. It also entailed the introduction of an institution with 
an elected, though not democratically elected, council. These assemblies 
were mandatory for cities with more than 3,000 inhabitants, i.e. one-third of 
Swedish cities were affected. However, it was also possible for smaller towns 
and rural municipalities to voluntarily introduce a representative system. 
Over the next fifty years, nearly every larger city formed assembly govern-
ments, but only one per cent of the smaller towns and rural municipalities 
took advantage of this opportunity. By 1917, five per cent of all munici-
palities had established elected councils, with the remaining ninety-five per 
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cent having general councils or municipal meetings as their highest-ranking 
decision-making body (Strömberg, 1974). The electoral system was reformed 
in 1918-19, making elected assemblies compulsory for cities with over 1,500 
inhabitants. The regulation was also made mandatory regardless of type of 
municipality (Strömberg, 1974). 
The right to vote was initially tied to land ownership and payment of 
taxes, which generally meant that for each “riksdaler” (a coin in the early 
Swedish currency system) of taxes paid, the taxpayer (individuals as well as 
private businesses) got one vote. As subsidies meant the poorest paid no 
taxes, it resulted in them having no right to vote (Bäck et al., 2005). With the 
first Local Government Act of 1862, a single holder of votes had a majority 
of the votes in approximately 50 municipalities (Aronsson, 2001). The differ-
ence in voting rights reflects the social power structure of Sweden at the time. 
In 1869, the number of votes per voter was restricted to 100. The voting 
reform of 1909 reduced this number to 40. The system of graded voting 
rights was completely abolished in the electoral reform of 1918-19, simulta-
neously extending the right to vote to women and introducing universal 
suffrage (Strömberg, 1974).  
The voting reform of 1907-1909 also stipulated that a qualified majority 
(a 2/3 majority) was needed for every political decision that entailed expan-
sion of municipal activities. However, the requirement for a qualified major-
ity for such decisions also meant that a minority could veto policy proposals 
that were deemed to be undesirable. Guarantees of intervention by central 
government were present in the Local Government Act of 1862. These guar-
antees were initially passive, but were activated in conjunction with the re-
forms of 1918. Those that were activated mainly concerned limitations on the 
activities of local governments, emphasising local governments’ position as 
subordinate organisations with tasks delegated to them from central govern-
ment (Östberg, 1996: 103). A commission appointed by the Liberal Party 
(Liberalerna) and the Social Democrats at national level in 1917 clearly de-
fined the limitations on municipal activities in order to circumscribe the polit-
ical majority that was about to come into power in many municipalities – the 
labour movement. The aim was not only to limit expansions of municipal 
activities, but to prevent so called “irresponsible democratic governance” by 
what were seen as the lower, uneducated, social classes. Using representative 
democracy as a way to protect a small and comparatively wealthy group from 
majority rule may seem surprising. However, through a well regulated system 
of proportionally elected drafting and executive bodies combined with slow 
moving social structures, the aim was to ensure a nondramatic transition to a 
new political era (Östberg, 1996). 
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In smaller municipalities, where municipal meetings were the highest-ranking 
decision-making body, a form of direct democracy was in use. However, these 
practices came to be considered undemocratic since many citizens did not 
attend the meetings and it was not uncommon for “coups” to occur at munici-
pal meetings, with disgruntled citizens mobilising their supporters prior to de-
cisions being taken (Ekström von Essen, 2003). To stop this development, rep-
resentative democracy was introduced in 1938 for all municipalities with more 
than 700 inhabitants (Fredriksson, 2015).  
Proportional elections were introduced in 1910 for cities with assembly 
governments, which opened up an opportunity for the Social Democrats to 
begin party politicising local elections in order to force the right wing parties to 
also enter into elections with separate party lists. No such party politicisation 
occurred in rural municipalities until after the voting reform of 1918-19. In 
1919, local elections with separate lists for each political party were held in 28 
per cent of rural municipalities. Even up until 1938, council members were still 
elected from a single list, a so-called “joint municipal list”, in 14 per cent of the 
rural municipalities with a Council (Östberg, 1996).  
In 1939, the idea of enforcing an amalgamation reform was presented in a 
parliamentary bill from members of the Social Democratic party. The main 
proposal of the bill was an expansion of municipal social services in com-
bination with a high degree of local self-government. Equity was at the core of 
these arguments; i.e. that citizens should have the same quantity and quality of 
public services regardless of where they lived (Ekström von Essen, 2002: 30). 
A government committee was subsequently appointed, which concluded its 
work in 1945 (Wångmar, 2003), and in 1946 Parliament decided to enforce a 
reform of the municipal structure. The aim was to merge small rural municipal-
ities into units of at least 2,000 citizens, resulting in the amalgamation of as 
many as 78 per cent of all rural municipalities. The main arguments for the 
reform were; 1, too many municipalities had become dependent upon financ-
ing from central government, 2, the differences in resources and conditions be-
tween the largest and smallest municipalities were too great, thus fostering in-
equality, 3, the increase in inter-municipal cooperation was seen as a threat to 
local self-government, 4, if municipal tasks were to be forcibly transferred from 
a municipality to county or central level of government, this too would be a 
threat to local self-government (Erlingsson et al., 2010). The motives to reform 
thus did not explicitly concern local political institutions, and effects caused by 
the reform to these institutions were side effects and not the primary aim. 
These discussions were put into effect in 1952, with the number of mu-
nicipalities being reduced from 2,498 to 1,037 as a part of the Great Municipal 
Amalgamation Reform (Storkommunreformen). There was a shared under-
SECTION 4 
 
32 
standing among the political parties in the national parliament regarding the 
necessity to reform. However, the initiative to reform came from national 
level. At local level, especially among smaller municipalities, there was some 
resistance towards the reform (Erlingsson et al., 2010; Wångmar, 2003: 166), 
and even though the reform was extensive, the rapid urbanisation process 
meant that just seven years later it was deemed insufficiently ambitious. A 
new amalgamation reform, the so-called Municipal Block Reform (Kommun-
blocksreformen), was consequently implemented in the period 1962-1974, 
reducing the number of municipalities to 277 (Erlingsson et al., 2010). Even 
in international comparisons, such a reform to the municipal structure is ex-
haustive (Lidström, 2003). 
According to Wångmar (2006), the Great Municipal Amalgamation Reform 
had two distinct effects on the party politicisation of local politics. First, all 
municipalities (except one) implemented assemblies as their highest-ranking 
decision-making body. Previously, only municipalities with more than 700 in-
habitants had to form assembly governments. However, this new develop-
ment meant that the use of municipal meetings as the primary decision-mak-
ing model had had its day. This new democratic practice was formalised in 
the Local Government Act of 1953, coming into force in 1955. This law also 
stated that municipal meetings were not to coexist with assemblies, as had 
previously been the case. Furthermore, there was now a sharp decline in mu-
nicipalities where assembly members were elected from a joint municipal 
list. There were 146 municipalities that applied joint lists in 1946, and by 
1950 there were only 3. 
There was no cohesive resistance from actors at central level regarding 
the amalgamation reforms. Instead, resistance came from local actors within 
the Right Party (Högern) and the Agrarian Party (Bondeförbundet), with their 
arguments concerning loss of history, tradition, identity, and community. Ar-
guments concerning losses for democracy were not used. Ekström von Essen 
(2003) points out that the political parties were not unaware of the potential 
effects for local democracy. Problems such as the risk of a reduction in the 
number of elected representatives per citizen, and thereby an increase in dis-
tance between citizens and political decision-making, were discussed within 
all parties. However, the two largest parties at the time, the Social Democrats 
and the Liberal Party (Liberalerna), had a shared conviction that the advan-
tages outweighed the negatives and that losses for democracy would be negli-
gible. They also argued that if other criteria for the reforms were to be met, 
the reforms would even have positive effects for local democracy (Ekström 
von Essen, 2003: 363ff). The most important condition was representative 
democracy. Assemblies were viewed as more democratic than municipal 
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meetings, with the former constituting representative democracy and the lat-
ter direct democracy. Political parties were now to formulate local party pro-
grammes, thus defining their visions for their localities, which would pro-
duce political alternatives from which citizens were then to choose. At this 
point in time, joint municipal lists and “ad hoc-solutions” were deemed out-
moded and old fashioned (Ekström von Essen, 2002: 49f). As predicted, the 
amalgamation reforms caused the number of elected officials per citizen to 
drop radically (Gidlund, 1983), and the increased size of the democratic unit 
made it more pluralistic and diverse – economically and culturally, as well as 
ideologically. 
 
Informal Party Politicisation of Local Politics 
The gradual introduction of party politicisation of local elections through 
constitutional reforms in the early 20th century did not mean that local elec-
toral campaigns were conducted with party programmes or that party affil-
iation came to structure local decision-making processes at the same pace. 
Party politicisation of municipalities in an informal sense was an even slower 
process, the foundation for which had been laid through the introduction of 
council institutions and equalisation of voting rights (Bäck, 2000). Strömberg 
and Westerståhl argue that the breakthrough for “real” party politicisation 
was the amalgamation reforms of 1952-74. An indication of this is that in 
1979 almost all of the local party organisations presented separate party pro-
grammes. This means that party politicisation of local electoral campaigns 
occurred almost 20 years after formal party politicisation of local elections was 
introduced (Strömberg & Westerståhl, 1983), and that informal institutions 
have had a strong influence over local democratic practices in Sweden. 
Local election campaigns increasingly came to focus on local issues rather 
than national matters, thereby manifesting party politicisation. An important 
component of this development was that nearly every political party established 
local party programmes where they stipulated what they wanted to achieve in 
the coming term of office. Another important difference was that the degree of 
political conflicts in the assemblies increased, and to a greater extent than 
before came to involve issues based in party political differences (Ekström von 
Essen, 2003). Traditional assembly government dominated local politics during 
the 1950s and 1960s. However, the 1970s constitute a breaking point where 
many municipalities transitioned from assembly government to a form of gov-
ernment involving displays of conflict in the assembly and where the majority 
appointed all seats as chair of committees and boards. A cleavage between the 
political parties at the local level was established post-1973, and from this point 
SECTION 4 
 
34 
it was either the centre/right or the left-wing parties that formed ruling coali-
tions. Broad coalitions consisting of both right- and left-wing parties occurred 
but were considered uncommon (Wångmar, 2006). From a historical perspec-
tive, the main difference between national and local democracy in Sweden is 
that while national politics has been filled with party political conflicts and 
polarisation between the political parties, local democracy has been charac-
terised by ideals of pragmatism and consensus (Sanne, 2001). However, from 
the 1970s new norms were established for how local politics was to be prac-
ticed. With the election of 1994, another breaking point was imminent. From 
1994, it was less common for the centre/right- or the left-wing parties to be able 
to uphold majorities on their local council on their own. A contributory factor 
in this development was that the Green Party (Miljöpartiet) had a national 
breakthrough, with their success resulting in the need for cooperation across the 
left-right divide in almost 30 per cent of municipalities (Wångmar, 2006). This 
emphasises the increased fragmentation and complexity of the party system 
that occurred in parallel with the large structural reforms. In 1980, the average 
number of parties represented in local councils was 5.6 and in 1993 this num-
ber had increased to 7.3, leading to increased difficulties in forming coalitions 
holding a majority of seats in a council. The Social Democratic Party and the 
Centre Party cooperated at national level in the 1990s. Wångmar (2006) argues 
that this cooperation might also have inspired representatives of these parties to 
cooperate at the local level, thereby making broad coalitions a more widespread 
practice and decreasing the divide between centre/right and left-wing parties.  
Earlier scholars have sought to estimate the level of party political conflicts 
at local level in Sweden in various ways. The different surveys and studies that 
have been produced tell us that the level of party political conflicts in an 
average sized municipality in the 1980s was the same as the level of party po-
litical conflicts in large cities in the 1960s (Wallin et al., 1981). Studies have 
also shown that these levels have continued to increase throughout the 1990s 
(Bäck, 2000) and that there is now no major difference in party politicisation 
between local and national level in Sweden (Gilljam et al., 2010b). 
 
Advocates of Party Politicisation of Local Politics 
Although local governments today are units of representative democracy, 
they were not initially viewed as political units at all in Sweden. During the 
19th and early 20th century, it was more important to solve local issues satis-
factorily than to display ideological differences (Fredriksson, 2015). They 
were organisations that utilised volunteer and non-profit resources in order to 
manage concerns that members of the municipalities had in common. Mu-
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nicipal activities were limited and they were not party politicised (Gidlund, 
1983). Neither did the form of government that was applied at the time, mu-
nicipal meetings with direct democracy, foster party politicisation. Towards 
the late 1930s, direct democracy was still applied in about 30 per cent of all 
municipalities (Gidlund, 1983).  
In many municipalities, the Social Democrats let the right wing parties 
retain many seats as chair, despite the fact that the Social Democrats were in 
the majority. Östberg (1996) argues that this was due to the fact that local 
politics was long viewed as something separate from party politics. Instead, 
there was an emphasis on expertise and ‘know-how’, and since right wing 
parties were more experienced they were often deemed to be better suited to 
rule. 
From the late 1940s and during the 1950s, there was an increase in party 
politicisation of local politics. The Social Democratic Party worked ex-
tensively in the 1940s to change local political norms and practices. Adolf 
Wallentheim, head of the Social Democratic Party’s information office and 
leader of the efforts to change local practices, wrote newsletters and travelled 
around the country encouraging local representatives to be more active and to 
formulate their own proposals on important issues. The Social Democratic 
Party thus initiated new practices in local politics and ideas of party politi-
cisation in municipalities started to spread. These efforts were part of an ex-
tensive project within the party with the goal of establishing new norms and 
standards for local politics (Ekström von Essen, 2002: 42ff). The strategies 
employed by the Social Democrats to foster and aid their local representa-
tives in their efforts to be more active and to politicise local issues produced 
patterns that were copied by other political parties. The other parties formed 
their own offices with similar tasks not long after the Social Democratic party 
established their central information office to assist their local representatives 
(Ekström von Essen, 2002). However, politicisation of local politics was not 
merely a top-down process. These ideals where disseminated and shared bet-
ween actors in a two-way process (Ekström von Essen, 2002; Forsell, 2014). 
The emergence of municipalities and the expansion of their responsibilities 
within the Swedish welfare state are closely linked to the Social Democratic 
Party and their view of what function the municipalities should play in society. 
Their position was that municipalities were vital for the construction of a func-
tioning welfare system and they should be the backbone of welfare and service 
provision. This point of view was not controversial as local actors had played a 
prominent role in the delivery of welfare services long before public provision 
of welfare services was formally established (Sellers & Lidström, 2007). Nei-
ther the Social Democratic Party nor the other parties wanted to change this. At 
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this time, the political parties were unanimous that the municipalities were 
fundamental for a nation that was to be modernised – made more efficient and 
equitable (Ekström von Essen, 2003). 
As previously mentioned, Strömberg and Westerståhl argue that party 
politicisation did not take place until the 1970s. Separate ballots for local par-
ties were produced before then, but this development was not accompanied by 
a change in political culture and practice (Strömberg & Westerståhl, 1983). 
However, based on the propaganda materials that all political parties produced, 
Ekström von Essen argues that it is evident that the parties had started to push 
their members and representatives at local level to formulate their own policies 
long before this. The ambition to engage in separate party politics began as 
early as the 1920s within the Social Democratic Party, and these efforts gained 
momentum in the 1940s (Ekström von Essen, 2003: 361). However, it was 
after the Municipal Block Reform of 1971, where rural and small municipali-
ties were merged into larger units, that party affiliation became more important 
for local democratic practices in general (Fredriksson, 2015), indicating that 
party politicisation may have been politically important internally long before it 
came to structure interactions between parties.  	
Institutional Conditions for Party Politicisation 
Comparative studies of local government reveal that Nordic local govern-
ments stand out when compared to other nations. Local governments are the 
main providers of welfare services in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Fin-
land. They also have strong local self-government, as well as viable finan-
cial strength (comparatively). Citizens of these countries also trust their local 
authorities more than citizens of other countries do (Hendriks et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, party politics is very important for the work of Swedish and 
Norwegian councillors while it only plays a lesser role for councillors in 
other European countries, for example France and Poland (Egner et al., 
2013).  
Today, local politics in Scandinavia has political parties at its core. They 
are central actors for local elections, organising the work in local councils 
and shaping local politics as a whole. Studies of party affiliation also show 
that in comparison with other European countries, Swedish councillors are at 
the top of the list with 99.6 per cent of councillors being party members. In 
comparison, party affiliation in Poland is only 29.5 per cent (Razin, 2013). 
Local councillors in Scandinavia also regard themselves as representatives of 
their parties to a greater extent than do councillors in most other European 
countries (Karlsson, 2013b). However, party politicisation has been a slow 
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process. Advocates of party politicisation of local politics played a vital role 
in both Sweden and Norway in shaping the conditions for the emergence of 
political parties at local level (Ekström von Essen, 2003; Hjellum, 1967). 
Formal regulations regarding local governments’ positions in the political 
systems and the foundation for their internal organisation, general and equal 
elections, and proportional elections have also been instrumental for party 
politicisation. Bäck, Offerdal and Aars (2005) argue that the authorisation to 
arrange proportional elections may even be the most important factor for 
party politicisation of local elections in Norway. Comparably in Sweden, it is 
the implementation of assemblies for all municipalities that is often regarded 
as the pivotal factor for party politicisation of municipalities. However, as 
mandatory assemblies and proportional elections were implemented simul-
taneously, it is not possible to say whether the effect of proportional elections 
was as important for party politicisation of Swedish municipalities as they 
were in Norway. 
Party political conflicts and informal majority rule were common in 
Swedish cities and larger municipalities as early as the 1960s (Strömberg, 
1965). The implementation of the Municipal Block Reform constituted an ide-
ological awakening as well as an increase in political conflicts for Swedish mu-
nicipalities (Wångmar, 2006). This reform, taken together with the expansion 
of the welfare system and of local governments’ service provision, the im-
plementation of assemblies for all municipalities, and the role of the Social 
Democratic Party, meant that local politics was given a greater role in society 
as a whole. With greater values at stake, competition between the parties be-
came stiffer. 
 
Strengthening the Local Executive 
Mayors and political leaders across Europe are experiencing a shift in the 
balance of power in local governments, in which the political executive has 
gained political leverage over the assembly. According to the mayors them-
selves, the assembly is now the least influential of all political actors in local 
democracy (Denters, 2006). In Sweden, there has been a sharp reduction in 
the number of politicians over time, which may have instigated this shift in 
the balance of power. The decrease in the total number of politicians is partly 
due to the municipal amalgamation reforms that were completed in 1974, fol-
lowing which, a debate was triggered on how democracy at the local level 
could be improved, or rather how a “vitalisation of local democracy” – a pop-
ular term in this debate – could be achieved. This has been one of the items 
subject to investigation by various governmental committees, municipalities, 
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counties, as well as by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and 
Regions (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, SKL), all of which have sug-
gested ways of improving democratic practices.  
Swedish local democracy is not alone in dealing with this dilemma. Some 
of the reforms that have been implemented, or suggested by different investi-
gations, can be viewed as part of an international trend for local governments to 
strengthen the local executive. This trend is manifested in various ways de-
pending on context. For example, there have been reforms aimed at enhancing 
the role of political leadership (Bäck et al., 2006), some countries have intro-
duced direct popular election of mayors (Borraz & John, 2004), for others it 
has meant a more general strengthening of executive leadership (Heinelt et al., 
2018), the introduction of formal parliamentary democracy (at least on a trial 
basis), and a reduction in the total number of local politicians, etc.  
For Sweden, this tendency is especially clear when considering the role of 
the assembly. According to the Local Government Act (kommunallagen), the 
assembly is an important arena for political representatives. However, today 
the assembly is informally regarded as “a stop en route”, with the primary 
mission being to legitimise decisions that have been made elsewhere in the 
municipal organisation and to make decision-making processes transparent. 
Assembly meetings are often viewed as well-directed theatre performances, 
where local leaders of party groups give reasons for the positions of their re-
spective parties. This tendency is also reflected in a survey from Statistics 
Sweden (SCB), where the representatives themselves specify that the position 
and/or political body with most influence over local politics is the Chair of 
the executive board or the Executive Board itself – not the assembly (SCB, 
2013). This means that the leading politicians, and the Chair of the executive 
board in particular, have leading positions both within their municipalities 
(Karlsson, 2006) and towards external actors (Johansson, 2005). 
The trend among Swedish local governments to remove most of their coun-
cil committees (nämnder) (as detailed in paper 2) can also be viewed from such 
a perspective. When implementing such reforms, decision-making processes 
are to be centralised on a small number of strong leaders within each munici-
pality. This is a reform that its advocates have argued has both enhanced demo-
cratic ideals and facilitated shorter and more efficient decision-making pro-
cesses. It is popularly claimed to “vitalise the Assembly”, and thus implies a 
diagnosis of assemblies as not dynamic enough. But the assembly’s lack of vi-
tality is most likely a consequence of having a strong local executive. 
As indicated in this literature review, informal majority rule was es-
tablished in the 1960s in the larger municipalities – long before it was com-
mon in the smaller municipalities (Strömberg, 1965). Along with the amal-
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gamation reforms and the subsequent increase in average size of municipal-
ities, there was also a general increase in level of political conflicts in local 
politics. This development illustrates the significance of municipal size for 
party political conflicts. Moreover, this literature review also shows that how 
Swedish local governments organise their political bodies is an important 
aspect for the relationship between political parties and how political con-
flicts are expressed and managed. The effects of these two factors, municipal 
size and organisational structure, will be further investigated in the papers 
that are part of this thesis. 
 
Quasi-parliamentary democracy 
A related challenge faced by Swedish local governments is the growing gap 
between formal regulation and democratic practices. The Local Government 
Act (kommunallagen) states that local councils appoint seats proportionally 
in council committees and boards. Formally, this means that local elections 
do not produce political “winners” and “losers”. Instead, all political parties 
that are large enough are granted seats in the political bodies, i.e. executive 
boards, council committees and municipally owned corporations. Moreover, 
members of these bodies are collectively accountable to the assembly for 
their political decisions and for the administrative operations they control. In 
a system where all political parties are accountable for everything, it is dif-
ficult for voters to hold political parties accountable – to reward or punish 
them through electoral processes. Such circumstances also entail a risk that 
oppositional parties are “co-opted” by the ruling parties and made jointly 
responsible as well as accountable. This tendency has been observed in 
Norwegian local governments (Mikalsen & Bjørnå, 2015: 180ff), and it is 
likely to occur in Swedish local governments as well. The fact that formal 
majority rule is not possible in Swedish local governments means that 
Swedish local democracy is best characterised as assembly government. 
There has been a reoccurring debate since the 1960s regarding the intro-
duction of formal majority rule in local governments (SOU 1972:32; SOU 
1993:90; SOU 2012:30; SOU 2016:5).  
In lieu of formal regulation, an informal practice of majority rule has been 
established in local governments since the 1960s. This informal version is 
sometimes referred to as “quasi-parliamentary democracy” (Bäck et al., 
2000), which means that the chair of council committees and boards is ap-
pointed by the ruling majority, or coalition, of the local council. A change to-
wards formal majority rule would in practice entail the introduction of a mu-
nicipal parliamentary system. Beyond making the Executive Board depen-
dent on the active, or passive, support of the assembly, there are different 
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views on what such a reform would entail. Some of the expected benefits are 
that political accountability would be strengthened as it would clarify who 
the political “winners” and “losers” are, political governance would be made 
more efficient, and the difference between political alternatives would be 
clarified – which could lead to an increased frequency in changes of power. 
One of the possible negative side effects is that the oppositional parties may 
find it difficult to voice their opinions; this would be especially hard on 
smaller parties (Montin 2004: 93f; SOU 2012:30). This informal version of 
majoritarian democracy that is practiced means that among the 290 mu-
nicipalities of Sweden there is a variation in how political conflicts are ex-
pressed and managed, and therefore also in how democracy is practiced.  
 
 41 
5 
Findings of the Papers 
 
This section presents the findings of the thesis’ four papers as short summaries. 
 
Paper I. Causes of Party Conflicts in Local Politics 
This article shows how the two forms of party conflict – political dissent and 
antagonistic behaviour – are related but explained by different factors, with 
political dissent mainly explained by the size of demos, while social frag-
mentation, fiscal stress and party contestation increase antagonistic be-
haviour. Presence of a local protest party inflates both forms of conflict. Sur-
prisingly, electoral contestation has less impact on conflict levels than earlier 
studies have suggested. The study is based on data from the KOLFU survey 
conducted among all councillors in the 290 municipalities in Sweden. 
 
Paper II. Where Did the Party Conflicts Go? 
Reforms aimed at strengthening the local executive have been implemented 
in recent decades. Some of the reforms affect the degree of specialisation in 
local governments. This article shows that, depending on degree of horizontal 
specialisation in a political system, political conflicts are expressed in dif-
ferent arenas and between different actors depending on the degree of hori-
zontal specialisation in a political system. In political organisations with a 
low degree of horizontal specialisation, party conflicts can be clarified in the 
local council. However, more issues are also depoliticised and the admin-
istration has increased discretion. One factor that instigates political conflicts 
is prioritisation between policy fields, rather than within fields. The study is 
based on an analysis of minutes from assembly meetings as well as inter-
views with leading local politicians and chief executive officers in three 
Swedish municipalities. 
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Paper III. Conflicting Estimations of Conflict 
This study reveals how politicians’ perceptions of conflict are affected by 
ideology, partisanship and trust. The results show that the effects differ de-
pending on the type of conflict. Socialists perceive political dissent as of a 
higher magnitude, while politicians who have higher levels of generalised 
and specified political trust perceive the level of antagonistic behaviour as 
lower. To be a political winner (in a ruling party coalition) or loser (in oppo-
sition) constitutes a social identity that fosters partisanship, which affects 
politicians’ perceptions. Politicians who are winners tend to perceive levels 
of both political dissent and antagonistic behaviour as of a lower magnitude. 
More insights about how and why political actors perceive the same situation 
differently could potentially foster a greater understanding – a political empa-
thy – among political combatants, facilitating their interactions. Moreover, if 
increased empathy generates more mutual political trust, this could in turn 
further reduce the perception of potentially damaging conflicts such as 
antagonistic behaviour. The study is based on data from the KOLFU survey. 
 
Paper IV. Political Conflicts and Marketization – 
Challenges for Political Leaders?  
[Politiska konflikter och marknadisering – utmaningar för politiska ledare?] 
 
A trend in many European countries is the strengthening of mayoral power. 
However, other trends are creating new challenges for mayors. The aim of 
this study is to investigate if, and to what extent, the two forms, political con-
flicts and marketization of the local administration, are challenging the in-
fluence of political leaders. Theoretically, these trends pull in different di-
rections; according to the former, there is an increase in party politicisation 
and according to the latter, political decision-making is moved away from the 
political arena. The results of this study show that political dissent inflates in-
fluence, and antagonistic behaviour decreases influence. These effects are true 
not only for political leaders, but for all the actors involved, even citizens. The 
results also show that effects of marketization were the reverse of what we ex-
pected – these reforms may even strengthen the influence of political leaders. 
The study is based the KOLFU survey from 2008 and 2012. 
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Contributions 
 
I will now discuss the results of the papers in relation to the research questions 
postulated. In this section I will answer research question number I (What is 
political conflict?), number II (What causes party political conflicts in local 
politics?) and number III (What are the effects of party political conflicts in 
local politics?). This section builds on the papers included in this thesis, and the 
different results are summarised and presented thematically. 
 
What Is Political Conflict? 
There is no lack of definitions of conflicts among earlier scholars. However, 
even though there are many definitions available, it is common for earlier 
scholars to either use the term “conflict” without defining to what they are re-
ferring, or to treat all forms of conflict as uniform. Regardless of which, they 
have openly disregarded the complexity of political conflicts. A point of de-
parture for this thesis is the idea that there are different forms of conflict and 
that studies where the different forms are included will enable a broadened 
understanding of what conflict is, what causes conflict, and what the effects 
of conflict are. A distinction between two forms of political conflicts – po-
litical dissent and antagonistic behaviour – has been made in the theoretical 
discussions in this thesis. These forms of conflict are theoretically derived 
and analytically distinct, but whether they can be found empirically and are 
forms of the same essence, i.e. aspects of one phenomenon, or different em-
pirical phenomena that may or may not be causally related, are empirical 
questions. The theoretical assumption of the papers included in this thesis 
regarding their possible relation is that political dissent could have an effect 
on antagonistic behaviour; i.e. the greater the degree of political dissent, the 
greater would be the antagonistic behaviour. Based on the results of the pa-
pers in this thesis, we can now confirm that the two forms of conflict are 
indeed interrelated. The papers show that the two forms of conflict are ex-
plained by different factors (papers 1, 2, and 3) and that they produce dif-
ferent effects (paper 4). If it were not possible to separate the two forms of 
conflict in the analyses of the papers included in this thesis, then the argu-
ment that these two forms of conflicts exists would fall. We can therefore 
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also conclude that they are separate forms of conflicts. In papers 1, 3 and 4, 
we could also confirm that political dissent has a positive effect on antagonis-
tic behaviour, and this supports the theoretical assumption that higher levels 
of political dissent produce an increase in antagonistic behaviour. 
What does this mean? Based on the results of the papers included in this 
thesis, we now know that the forms of conflict are separate phenomena, and 
it is likely that they have different contributions to a political system. Politi-
cal dissent refers to the substance of political programmes and policies, and 
clarity towards voters in relation to the parties’ positions and on where the 
parties’ political views differ may facilitate the voters’ choice on Election 
Day. Political dissent may consequently be seen as a facilitator in this aspect 
and therefore a necessary element in a representative democracy. Antagonis-
tic behaviour, however, refers to the political climate and to how the parties 
behave towards each other. A limited amount of antagonistic behaviour might 
enable a clarification of the difference between parties. However, a high degree 
of antagonistic behaviour refers to situations where the parties actively try to 
stop other parties from exerting political influence, which may ultimately 
lead to a negative and disrespectful climate among the political represen-
tatives. Other than producing a negative work environment for the political 
representatives, an excessive amount of antagonistic behaviour may serve little 
purpose in a democratic system. This means that it is important to distinguish 
between the varying forms of conflict. Political dissent and antagonistic be-
haviour have different characteristics, are caused by different factors, play dif-
ferent roles in a democracy and produce different democratic effects. 
 
What Causes Party Political Conflicts in Local Politics? 
In this thesis, three of the articles and the section on politicisation in the intro-
duction have focused on this research question. These results are summarised 
and presented thematically in this section, and their effects on the two forms of 
party political conflicts are discussed. 
 
Social Fragmentation 
Political conflicts between individuals and different social groups can be found 
at all levels of society and politics. However, when there is a widespread frag-
mentation of society it becomes more difficult for a single political party to 
effectively represent the plurality of views held by voters (Sullivan, 1973). Al-
location of a society’s shared resources may involve favouring one social group 
or interest over another, leading to a conflict of interest between social groups. 
Such situations would provide opposing parties with potential divisions to use 
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in their favour. This is in line with Bartolini and Mair (1990), who argue that a 
politicised division is comprised of three elements. The first is empirical, with a 
social structure where different social groups are stratified. The second element 
is normative, where those belonging to a social group share values that shape a 
common identity. The third element is organisational, where organisations such 
as political parties represent the different interests of social groups. This means 
that some of the conflicting interests in society are manifested within the party 
system. Earlier studies have shown that diversity and social fragmentation in 
society are linked to the political situation in the parliament (Aistrup, 2004; 
Koetzle, 1998; Layman et al., 2006; Sullivan, 1973). Consequently, in paper 1 
we hypothesised that the conflicting interests in society are manifested in polit-
ical dissent between political parties in the parliamentary arena. Furthermore, it 
is argued that social fragmentation could also influence antagonistic behaviour 
among political representatives. If there is a causal relationship between the 
two, it is more likely that a higher degree of social fragmentation may lead to 
increased antagonistic behaviour; as social fragmentation in a society makes 
political issues related to different social groups more contested. 
The results of the analysis of party conflicts in Swedish municipalities, 
paper 1, is that social fragmentation in the locality increases antagonistic be-
haviour among political actors, and that the degree of political dissent also 
has a strong effect on antagonistic behaviour. However, there was no evi-
dence to support the hypothesis that social fragmentation in the locality has 
any effect on political dissent. These results were also confirmed in paper 3. 
It is surprising that a more heterogeneous locality does not produce wider po-
litical dissent. Given the results and the effect that social fragmentation has 
on antagonistic behaviour, it is likely that social fragmentation affects local 
politics by other means than through the parties’ positions on political issues. 
Perhaps it is not primarily the social composition of the locality that affects 
the political beliefs of local political actors, but rather social aspects of the 
region or the nation as a whole. 
A common assumption among earlier scholars is to associate size of demos 
with an increase in diversity and social fragmentation, but this effect is not au-
tomatic. Just as there may be large democratic units that are homogenous, there 
may be small units that are heterogeneous. For this reason, there were separate 
indicators for social fragmentation and size of demos included in the analysis 
of paper 1.   
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Size of Demos 
One of the most decisive aspects of political life is the size of the democratic 
unit, with the search for the ideal size of demos engaging scholars ever since 
the birth of the concept of democracy. Studies have also shown that many cir-
cumstances that vary with size of demos are of great importance for demo-
cratic practices (Denters et al., 2014). A classic assumption in democratic 
theory is to associate good democratic performance with smaller units (Dahl 
& Tufte, 1973). Democratic participation between elections is also higher in 
smaller units. However, as the size of the democratic unit increases, so does 
the demand for democratic practices that to a lesser extent are based on indi-
vidual engagement and more on practices where citizens rely on collective 
action and join organisations (Houlberg, 2003; Mouritzen, 1991). Addition-
ally, a larger demos also fuels the creation of political alternatives – leading 
to a wider range of challengers (Karlsson, 2013a), increasing political dis-
tance between political parties (Saglie, 2002), as well as tougher competition 
and conflict among political parties, which would pave the way for better-
qualified representatives (Padovano & Ricciuti, 2009). In larger democratic 
units, party organisations are larger and more professionalised, whereas party 
organisations in smaller units are often more dependent on the engagement of 
individuals and on personal relationships, meaning that size of the demos 
would shape the party political dynamics in the parliamentary arena. Earlier 
studies have also found that larger democratic units encourage political con-
flict and contestation (Bäck, 2000; Gerring et al., 2015; Karlsson, 2013a). As 
the size of a democratic unit increases, it is likely to become more pluralistic 
and diverse – economically, culturally, ideologically etc. – which paper 1 hy-
pothesised would be positively related to both political dissent and antag-
onistic behaviour among political parties. 
The comparison of municipalities in paper 1 showed that size has a clear 
effect on political conflict. These results were also confirmed in paper 3. A 
common assumption would be that the effect of size is due to increased di-
versity and fragmentation in society, but the results showed that the effect of 
size does not seem to be related to the indicators for diversity and social frag-
mentation. A possible explanation is that the size of democratic unit is related 
to the dynamics of party politics – rather than to diversity. In big municipal-
ities, party organisations are larger, which could mean that dissent between 
parties is more easily produced. A surprising finding of the effect of the size 
of the demos is that it primarily regards political dissent and not antagonistic 
behaviour. The effect of size actually disappears when political dissent is 
introduced into the analysis. This implies that the effect of size is channelled, 
in some way, through political dissent. These findings are supported by the 
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findings in section 3, party politicisation of Swedish local governments, where 
we were able to observe that in larger cities and municipalities, party political 
conflicts and informal majority rule were common as early as the 1960s 
(Strömberg, 1965), long before it spread to the smaller municipalities, and as a 
consequence of the amalgamation reforms, where the average size of Swedish 
municipalities drastically increased, the general level of political conflicts in 
the local governments was inflated. This indicates that the more the size of 
demos has increased in Sweden, the more heightened the level of political con-
flicts has become. And from a historical perspective, size of demos has been a 
crucial factor for party politicisation of Swedish municipalities.  
 
Fiscal Stress 
Another factor that it can be argued influences levels of party political conflicts 
is fiscal stress. Earlier studies have shown that there is a relationship between 
the political situation in the parliament and fiscal performance (Besley et al., 
2010; Padovano & Ricciuti, 2009; Solé-Ollé, 2006). Some scholars have also 
noted that fiscal stress is a potential source of political conflicts (Lantto, 2005). 
This is based on the observation that a lack of economic resources would make 
it harder for the ruling majority to satisfy demands from their voters and from 
different social groups. Also, in a strained financial situation, it becomes all the 
more important for the ruling majority to coordinate their actions and cooperate 
in order to get policy proposals through a parliamentary arena (Lantto, 2005). 
Fiscal stress could therefore cause tension between political parties and be-
tween the ruling majority and the opposition, leading to an increase in antag-
onistic behaviour as each party strives to satisfy their respective voters in a 
harsh economic climate. Conversely, times of low fiscal stress would increase 
the potential for political cooperation (Brorström & Siverbo, 2008). 
The results of paper 1 show a clear effect of fiscal stress on political con-
flicts. However, the effects of fiscal stress on political conflicts identified 
were related to internal factors. These results were confirmed in paper 3. The 
expectation might be that it is the economic situation in society that would 
have the greatest effect, but economic growth and prosperity in the locality as 
a whole had no effect. Instead, the effect came from the municipalities’ inter-
nal fiscal situation – their solvency. Solvency is the ability of local govern-
ments to meet their long-term financial obligations. However, the degree of 
stress that is caused by such long-term factors is arguable; it is plausible that 
a measurement of short-term fiscal stress would lead to an even more stress-
ful situation for local governments. More research is needed to ascertain 
whether this would have a greater effect on political conflicts. But as a sub-
sequent comparison of local governments across Europe has confirmed this 
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finding, showing that fiscal stress affects levels of political conflicts regard-
less of local government system (Navarro et al., 2018), this means that these 
results do indicate that times of strained financial resources and budgets fuel 
antagonistic behaviour among political parties.  
 
Presence of Protest Parties 
The party system is also based upon political cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 
1967) and is dependent on voters’ perceptions of how well the political parties 
relate to fundamental and relevant societal conflicts. Political actors need to up-
hold the vitality of the relation that exists between citizens and political parties 
(Demker, 2015). When new political cleavages arise, or if the established polit-
ical parties are seen as inflexible to changing values and opinions of voters, this 
could lead to the formation of new political parties (Lawson & Merkl, 1988). 
The presence of a protest party in a parliamentary arena could also be seen as a 
manifestation of voters’ discontent with the established parties and their in-
ability to represent their views and ideas (Erlingsson, 2005). This means that a 
protest party is likely to have positions on policies that differ considerably from 
the positions of the established parties, thus increasing the overall political dis-
sent in a parliamentary arena. Furthermore, a protest party is likely to make it 
its mission to not only represent its voters’ view on policies – but also to chan-
nel their discontent with established parties. It is therefore likely that the antag-
onistic behaviour in the parliamentary arena also increases.  
The results of paper 1 show that protest parties are indeed associated with a 
heightened degree of both political dissent and antagonistic behaviour. The 
presence of a local protest party was also included as a control in paper 3, and 
the results of this paper showed that it is not the representatives of local protest 
parties that perceive political conflicts as greater. Instead, it seems to be the 
other representatives in a parliamentary arena that experience an increased lev-
el of conflict when local protest parties enter into that environment. 
In relation to Swedish politics, it is interesting to note that the results also 
showed that the presence of the Sweden Democrats, a nationalist populist 
party, had no significant effect on the political conflicts in the assemblies. From 
an empirical perspective, one would have expected the Sweden Democrats to 
rally discontented voters under their flag and to heighten the level of political 
conflicts in a parliamentary arena. But it seems to be the local protest parties 
who are more successful in this regard. This could indicate that the role of the 
Sweden Democrats in Swedish politics is either misunderstood or that the pres-
ence of this party brings the established parties closer together, leaving the 
overall level of political conflict unaffected. 
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Political Contestation 
Electoral contestation is often held up as a cause of political conflicts be-
tween political parties. There is no doubt that political parties may have dif-
ferent objectives; they might, for example, seek to attain office or implement 
certain political ideas or programmes (Adams & Merrill, 2009; Müller & 
Strøm, 1999). But even in situations where a party falls above or below what 
is required for a seat, a high number of votes are nevertheless viewed as de-
sirable (Stigler, 1972). Having retained a high number of votes can be a used 
as a sign of strength or appeal in the contest with other political parties. This 
means that all parties, regardless or their main objective, have an incentive to 
be responsive to shifts in public preferences in order to attract more voters. 
Political contestation is the degree of political competition in a political unit. 
Contestation is low when there is little organised opposition and the domi-
nant party captures most of the votes and seats, and contestation thrives when 
there are more challengers than there are available seats and frequent shifts of 
power occur which lead to a tight race among the political parties for seats 
(Gerring et al., 2015). In a situation with a high level of political contestation, 
political parties or candidates become fearful of losing office and will then, in 
an effort to sustain their votes, deliver policies closer to the ones preferred by 
the median voter (the so-called median-voter hypothesis) (Adams et al., 2004; 
Adams & Merrill, 2009; Downs, 1957; Ezrow et al., 2011; Gerber & Lewis, 
2004; Schumacher, De Vries et al., 2013). A high degree of political contes-
tation may thus cause a decrease in political dissent between the political 
parties, and as a high degree of contestation means that there is an even divi-
sion of mandates between the majority and opposition, this would also force 
them to coordinate their efforts among themselves in order to realise their 
political agenda, thereby increasing antagonistic behaviour between the op-
posing sides (Lantto, 2005). 
However, contrary to previous studies, the results of paper 1 show that 
political contestation is not nearly as important for political conflicts as sug-
gested. There is a stream of literature arguing the importance of contestation 
as a way of understanding the behaviour of political parties and representa-
tive democracy. But the analysis in paper 1 shows that the relationship be-
tween contestation and political conflicts in the form of political dissent and 
antagonistic behaviour is far from clear. Heightened political contestation is 
not associated with a lower degree of political dissent. These results were 
also confirmed in paper 3, and a possible explanation for these results is that 
the anticipation that high levels of contestation would produce less dissent 
emerged from the median-voter hypothesis, and many of the scholars advo-
cating this hypothesis base their studies on two-party systems. Perhaps these 
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results should not be expected to occur in multi-party systems, where the 
concept of political contestation is inherently unclear. Moreover, as only two 
of the five indicators for contestation were accompanied by a positive effect 
on antagonistic behaviour, this means that the relationship between contes-
tation and antagonistic behaviour is more complex than expected.  
 
Horizontal Specialisation 
Political systems are dependent upon specialisation with division of labour 
into units and sub-units. Horizontal specialisation is an expression of the 
number of specialised sub-units at the same administrative level (Bezes et al., 
2013; Egeberg, 2012). As organisational structures are normative, constitut-
ing rules and roles specifying who is expected to do what and how (Scott, 
1981), this means that political institutions (electoral systems, parliament, ex-
ecutive bodies etc.) help shape the rules for the parliamentary arena and con-
sequently, how these institutions are designed affects the politicians’ be-
haviour and how they perceive their role (see for example Bukve & Saxi, 
2014; Bäck, 2003b; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Hagen & Vabo, 2005; Vabo, 
2000;). Lijphart’s work also shows that the way in which political institutions 
are organised influences the character of political conflicts (Lijphart, 1999). 
The political bodies and their design sets the framework for how political 
conflicts are expressed and managed. This means that it is crucial to under-
stand the organisational setting of political actors as they can have great in-
fluence over the behaviour and interactions of political actors.  
Depending on degree of horizontal specialisation of a political system, 
party conflicts can be expressed in different arenas and between different 
actors. Paper 2 shows that in political systems with a high degree of horizon-
tal specialisation, conflicts in the form of antagonistic behaviour can be found 
between council committees as they act as advocates for their respective 
policy sectors. They therefore often find themselves in conflict with politi-
cians from their own political party who are advocating for other policy 
sectors. In political organisations with a low degree of horizontal specialisa-
tion, we can see that work in the parliamentary arena is different. As there are 
now no council committees with decision-making powers, there are now 
more unresolved issues from a range of policy fields directed towards the 
parliamentary arena. This development has triggered political conflicts in the 
parliament with the result that in organisations with a low degree of horizon-
tal specialisation, political dissent has been clarified in the parliamentary 
arena and antagonistic behaviour has also intensified. Based on the results of 
paper 2, the cause or mechanism behind this revitalisation is twofold; 1, the 
parliamentary arena now has the discretion to debate and decide on policies 
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that were not previously agreed in other arenas, and 2, along with their in-
creased discretion, they have the ability to make priorities between policy 
fields, fuelling political conflicts between political actors. For it is in the are-
nas with authority to make priorities between policy fields that chances for 
political conflicts to be expressed are greater. 
On the basis of these results, it could be argued that political systems where 
there is a low degree of horizontal specialisation are favourable. Political rep-
resentatives in such systems are more frequently able to make priorities be-
tween values, which instigate political conflicts between political actors, and 
when conflicts are accentuated, the chances of democratic accountability are 
improved. However, as the results also show, in organisations with a low de-
gree of horizontal specialisation, more cases are depoliticised and delegated to 
the administration. De-politicisation of cases gives rise to a democratic dilem-
ma; political representatives are responsible for all matters addressed by their 
administration, but when the discretion of the administration increases due to 
de-politicisation, the ability of citizens to hold their representatives accountable 
is diminished. This could result in a zero sum game where the chance of demo-
cratic accountability is heightened at one end of the political system, but con-
currently foreshortened at the other. 
 
Political Psychology 
The behaviour and attitudes of individual political actors varies with, and in 
response to, differences in political institutions, political cultures, leadership 
styles, social norms, etc. Our behaviour, attitudes and perceptions are shaped 
by a complex mix of culture, context and individual psychology (Huddy et al., 
2013). Beyond structural and institutional explanations of political conflicts, 
actors can also experience them differently. Parts of what constitute political 
conflicts may be visible, observable and formal. We can see positions taken by 
the political parties, which are in agreement and which are in disagreement. We 
can know which parties cooperate as a ruling majority and who constitute the 
opposition. But some aspects of political conflicts are informal, subjective and 
obscured. Many scholars have engaged in studying what factors affect and re-
inforce individuals’ perceptions and political behaviour (Huddy et al., 2013). 
Based on earlier studies within the field of political psychology where the focus 
is to understand the behaviour of individuals within political systems, it is like-
ly that whether a political conflict is perceived to be major or minor, it is likely 
to have a great influence on the behaviour of political actors. Perception is the 
manner by which individuals receive and process sensory impressions in order 
to make sense of the world around them. Based on our life experiences, we all 
have different outlooks on life and those differences contribute to variations in 
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our perception of situations. While a group of people may be looking at the 
same simple object, each person has their own perception of what the object is. 
This means that each individual has a different perception of any given situ-
ation. Such differences may be due to a number of factors that create filters in-
fluencing our responses to a situation (Jervis, 2017).  
Paper 3 focused on three factors that are of distinct relevance for per-
ception of political conflicts: ideology, partisanship and trust. Ideologies con-
stitute the core of politics, composing belief systems that provide individuals 
with an interpretation of the social world. Partisanship and trust are also dis-
tinct aspects of inter-group relations and social features that affect how we per-
ceive our relationships, political institutions as well as ourselves. These are 
central properties of political practices, and have effects on how political con-
flicts are perceived. 
 
Ideology and Political Orientation 
Ideology is the shared beliefs, opinions and values of a group, class or so-
ciety. Though not all values and beliefs in an ideology are unanimously ac-
knowledged within the group, they are widely shared and spread (Freeden, 
2004; Jost et al., 2009;). In ideologies with a collectivist perspective on so-
ciety, such as socialism and feminism, individuals are seen as members of 
different social groups and as such they have different interests that gives rise 
to power struggles and conflicts between them (Liedman, 2012). As socialists 
tend to view political parties as manifestations of societal conflicts, for ex-
ample between labour and capital, we hypothesised in paper 3 that socialist 
politicians will perceive party relations as more conflicted than politicians 
that follow more individualistic or conservative ideologies. 
The results of this paper showed that being a socialist has a directly pos-
itive effect on the perception of political dissent. But it only has a weak and 
indirect effect on perception of antagonistic behaviour – via political dissent. 
A reasonable conclusion is that perception of political positions is affected by 
ideology while perception of behaviour is not. 
 
Partisanship 
Being a political representative is more than devotion to an ideology – it is 
about being member of a group and identifying with it, thus building psy-
chological attachments to that group. Social identity is the manner in which 
individuals incorporate group membership into their self-concept (Huddy, 
2003), which may foster partisanship (Greene, 1999, 2004). Supporting a team 
may alter one’s perception of events, indicating that partisanship can have sig-
nificant effects on both behaviour and attitudes. Studies of how people react to 
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experiencing the defeat of their sporting team serve to illustrate the mechanism 
at work in relation to partisanship. Where loyalty to a group, or team, involves 
emotional reactions where supporters share both pride in victory and bitterness 
in defeat, it also involves mechanisms of rationalisation in which defeat is often 
attributed to external factors or foul play by the opposing team. Such rational-
isations serve to protect the group’s standing – and by extension one’s own 
sense of pride (Mann, 1974).  
Earlier scholars of political behaviour have analysed the effects of being a 
political winner or loser, where winners are those supporting the parties in 
government and losers are parties that are out of government. These studies 
demonstrate that electoral “winners” and “losers” differ with respect to many 
different attitudes. For example, there is a tendency to prefer practices that 
are beneficial for the party and to interpret situations in a way that puts the 
party in a favourable light (Holmberg, 1999; Karlsson, 2017). This illustrates 
that being a winner seems to put many things in a more positive light. Based 
on this, we hypothesised that being a winner or loser creates a distinction be-
tween political actors, and their differing experiences of political work shape 
their perceptions of conflict in such a way that representatives of parties in 
the ruling majority (”the winners”) perceive political conflicts as of a lower 
magnitude than representatives of parties in opposition (“the losers”).  
The results of paper 3 showed that partisanship does indeed have a negative 
effect on perception of levels of conflict, and also that the effect on perception 
of antagonistic behaviour (but not that of political dissent) is closely related to 
specific local trust. 
 
Trust 
Trust can refer to specific political institutions and actors (i.e. political trust: 
Newton, 2007) as well as institutions and people in general. Generalised trust is 
trust in strangers (Uslaner, 2002), and it is often claimed to be an intrinsic part 
of personality characteristics where people displaying high levels of gener-
alised trust have a confident, optimistic and cooperative disposition (Allport, 
1961; Newton, 2007; Uslaner, 1999, 2000, 2002), indicating that trust is part of 
shaping one’s worldview and establishing a framework for how we assess 
events and situations. People with low levels of generalised trust tend to have a 
critical or negative view of the world and its people. They are also more in-
clined to perceive behaviour of others as contrarian and disingenuous. Con-
versely, it is argued that high levels of trust are conducive to cooperation 
(Deutsch, 1958; McKnight et al., 1998) and behaviours that are inclusive to-
wards new members (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Fukuyama, 1995; La Porta et 
al., 1997; Putnam, 1993), those with high-levels of generalised trust are also 
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more inclined to have an understanding view of the intentions of others. We 
therefore hypothesised that people with high levels of generalised trust per-
ceive political conflicts to be of a lesser magnitude than people with lower 
levels of trust.  
However, trust is not merely part of one’s personal characteristics; it is also 
based on life experiences, with personal involvement in a situation or event be-
coming part of shaping one’s perception of the world (Jervis, 2017). Political 
representatives are not merely observers of political events – they themselves 
participate in political processes and those experiences are likely to shape their 
trust. This means that there is a specified local trust that is based on the trust 
one has in specific local actors and institutions, and we considered that political 
conflicts would be perceived as having a lesser magnitude among those with a 
high level of specified trust in local actors and institutions. 
The results of paper 3 suggest that politicians who have higher levels of 
both generalised and specified political trust perceive the level of antagonistic 
behaviour as lower. But there were no effects of either generalised or specific 
local trust on perception of political dissent, a result that refutes the hypothesis 
that we postulated. This means that politicians’ trust in both political institu-
tions and in other people has stronger correlations with how they perceive their 
colleagues and their behaviour than with their perceptions of their colleagues’ 
positions. 
 
What Are the Effects of Party Political Conflicts in Local 
Politics? 
One of the papers in this thesis answers the research question regarding what 
the effects of party political conflicts are. It focused specifically on how politi-
cal conflicts affect the influence of local political leaders. This section sum-
marises the results of this paper and discusses the effects of the two forms of 
party political conflicts on the influence of local political leaders. 
 
Influence of Political Leaders 
The influence of mayors varies over time between countries with different 
systems of local government, between municipalities within the same coun-
try, and within the same municipality. Formal and informal factors at struc-
tural, organisational and individual level enhance and weaken the position of 
the mayor (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006). Who the 
mayor is and the institutional context in which leadership is exercised are 
crucial for their ability to implement their political programmes. Local polit-
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ical leaders in the Nordic countries play an important role in their munic-
ipalities (Goldsmith & Larsen, 2004). The equivalent of the Swedish mayor 
is the chair of the Executive Board. Even though they have always had a 
leading position in local politics, due to a gradual reduction in the number of 
local representatives, political power has become even more centralised on 
the leading political actors (Karlsson et al., 2009). Another change that 
strengthens the influence of mayors is the increased emphasis on majoritarian 
democracy and party political cohesion within the ruling majority (Skoog, 
2011). 
In the section on party politicisation of Swedish local governments that is 
included in this thesis (section 4), I argued that in recent decades Swedish 
local government has been transformed into a veritable competitive democ-
racy. Increased party politicisation means that issues that used to be solved in 
a consensual manner are now to a greater extent objects of political dispute. 
This development has brought with it new challenges for the local political 
leaders as they now need to navigate in a local context that is increasingly 
party politicised. 
The display of political differences between political representatives and 
the fact that they enforce policies that may clash with positions of other ac-
tors is essential for representative democracy to function. However, even 
though political conflicts are important for democracy, they can sometimes 
be depicted as an obstacle to political processes and have effects for munici-
pal operations (Houlberg & Pedersen, 2015). As Swedish local politics has 
become more party politicised over time, this has most likely become more 
challenging. It may, for instance, make it more difficult for political leaders 
to cooperate with other actors and to direct local government administration. 
If emphasis is placed on political leaders’ ability to direct administrative op-
erations, politicians should strive towards putting party differences aside and 
to cooperate in exercising strong leadership in relation to the administration. 
From such a perspective, political conflicts are a distraction or even an ob-
struction to the ability of political leaders to oversee the implementation of 
political decisions. The more political conflicts are intensified, the more they 
can be expected to diminish the influence of political leaders. And converse-
ly, their influence can be expected to increase the more conflicts are reduced.  
In paper 4, our expectations were that an increase in both forms of po-
litical conflict would lead to a decrease in influence for political leaders, and 
a strengthening of citizens’ influence. However, it is only antagonistic be-
haviour that has such effects. Instead, political dissent might even have the 
effect of strengthening political influence. These effects were true for all cat-
egories of political actors – even for citizens. This means that it is important 
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to make a distinction between the two forms of conflict; they have different 
characteristics, produce different effects and may consequently also have dif-
ferent contributions to a political system. 
A cornerstone of representative democracy are the political representa-
tives and political parties that represent different ideologies, social groups 
and interests, and who because of this may find themselves in conflict with 
each other. Exercising political leadership is a balancing act between the val-
ues of collective processes and the values of effectively enforcing political 
programmes – even in situations where there is widespread disagreement be-
tween political parties. Political conflicts are often depicted by scholars, as 
well as in social debate, as a problem or even as the culprit. But the results of 
paper 4 show that this is a myth. Political actors need to manage the chal-
lenge of expressing their positions clearly and displaying their inherent politi-
cal differences, and simultaneously acting with respect towards those who 
represent different positions. Paper 3 suggests that politicians, depending on 
their political orientation, partisanship, and levels of trust, might perceive po-
litical conflicts differently. Taken together, this knowledge might help to 
build greater understanding among politicians, and foster an environment 
based on political empathy. An environment where trust in others is strength-
ened could even entail antagonistic behaviour among political actors being 
perceived as less problematic. Such an environment is no threat to democ-
racy, but may even serve to strengthen democratic ideals and make way for 
the focus to be placed on the political dissent that is a necessity for demo-
cratic systems. 
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7 
Political Conflicts – the Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly 
 
This thesis provides a contribution to the theory of political conflicts as well 
as to our empirical understanding of the phenomenon. The studies included 
show that a nuanced view of political conflict is fruitful and that political 
conflicts involve several aspects: individuals may have different perceptions 
of conflict, how we organise political systems will affect where and how they 
are expressed, and the size of the demos, social fragmentation, fiscal stress, 
protest parties, and contestation will all affect the levels and form of political 
conflicts. The two forms of conflict may also have different consequences for 
the influence of political leaders. 
This section discusses the results of the studies included in the thesis. The 
first section reflects on the implications for local government, and the second 
section addresses implications for the theory of political conflicts and their 
role in a democratic system from a normative perspective. 
 
Implications for Local Governments 
In multi-level political systems such as the Swedish system where local go-
vernments have a high level of autonomy – and according to the opening para-
graph of the Swedish constitution, Swedish democracy is realised through mu-
nicipal self-government – the national parliament and government is dependent 
upon local governments to implement their policies. This means that studies 
such as these, which concern municipal size, degree of sectorisation, and the in-
stitutions for political decision-making have important implications for local 
governments.  
Municipal size is a crucial institutional factor in determining the range of 
municipal activities, organisational structure and possibilities for citizen par-
ticipation. The discussion in Sweden regarding municipal size and democracy 
has been on-going for well over half a century, and this has led to two major 
amalgamation reforms (Erlingsson et al., 2010). These reforms were radical, 
and with the number of Swedes doubling over the same period, the munici-
palities have consequently grown in size, both in population and in range of 
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services, while the reduction in municipalities has also decreased the total 
number of local politicians. Based on the results of this thesis, we now know 
that municipal size is an important institutional aspect with regards to both 
level and form of political conflict. Municipal size can have a major impact 
on the dynamics of local politics, with political work in smaller municipal-
ities often more informal and reliant on engagement of individuals, while po-
litical work in larger municipalities tends to be focused around the political 
parties. We now also know that size, controlled for social fragmentation, has 
a separate effect on levels of political dissent and the smaller a municipality 
is, the lesser is the chance for political dissent between political parties. This 
means that how we organise our municipalities – for example how small or 
large they are – will have a major impact on the character of political con-
flicts, and, depending on whether we view political dissent between political 
parties as desirable or not, we may have different positions regarding how 
small or large municipalities should be. 
Swedish municipalities traditionally organise their administration into local 
branches according to different policy areas, with matching council committees 
where members elected by the assembly are responsible for the activities un-
dertaken by the administration within a specific policy area (for example ed-
ucation or environment). However, a growing number of municipalities have 
chosen to redesign their political organisations and remove most of the coun-
cil committees where many local politicians are engaged (Karlsson et al., 
2009; Siverbo, 2014). Reformists have argued that it is not only possible but 
also necessary for politicians to refrain from day-to-day involvement in ad-
ministrative operations. It is argued that politicians neither have the right 
level of expertise nor the ability to understand the administrative operations 
well enough to make decisions that are necessary for such a level of involve-
ment. The reforms implemented have hence sought to fundamentally change 
the traditional role of politicians. In implementing these re-forms, politicians 
are to be encouraged to devote themselves to issues of broader ideological 
relevance rather than the details of administrative operations. However, as 
political and administrative bodies are interconnected institutions, it is rea-
sonable to assume that such reforms to the political system will have effects 
on relations between political parties and between politics and administration. 
As it is most often smaller or average sized municipalities which choose to 
reform their organisation in this manner, this is also associated with the size 
of municipalities. 
Based on the results of this thesis, we know that depending on how we 
structure our political systems, political conflicts will be expressed in different 
institutional arenas and between different political actors. It could therefore be 
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argued that political systems with a low degree of horizontal specialisation are 
favourable. In such systems, political representatives more often have the abil-
ity to make priorities between values, which instigate political conflicts be-
tween political actors. And when conflicts are accentuated, chances for demo-
cratic accountability are improved. However, as the results also show, this or-
ganisational reform has meant that more cases are depoliticised and delegated 
to the administration. What this implies in particular for Swedish local gov-
ernments is that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has become more influ-
ential. It is to a great extent the responsibility of the CEO to determine what 
issues are to be managed by political bodies, and what issues are to be dele-
gated to the administration. Administrators are servants of democracy, and in 
this function they are formally subordinate to the local political decision-
making power. They are employed to implement the policies, decisions and 
priorities that are set by political representatives. However, a recent study 
shows that public administrators in Sweden would now to a great extent like 
the influence of political representatives to be weakened (Johansson et al., 
2018). This development, in combination with the results of paper 2 where 
the position of the CEO has been accentuated in centralised political systems, 
indicates a worrying future for the state of local democracy.  
In addition to the risk of increasing the influence of the unelected admin-
istration over political issues, there is also a risk that the administration is 
now faced with the challenge of managing unresolved political conflicts. Is-
sues that would have been managed by council committees in a political sys-
tem with a high degree of horizontal specialisation are perhaps issues where 
the dimension of conflict is at a low level – but not non-existent. When these 
issues are delegated to the administration, it becomes the task of the adminis-
tration to manage these conflicts. More research is needed for us to ascertain 
what types of issues are delegated to the administration, and in turn, how the 
administration handles this challenge and how the CEOs manage their in-
creased influence over political issues in centralised political systems. 
 
Implications for the Theory of Political Conflicts 
In political systems based on representative democracy, political parties are 
important at all levels of government for the articulation, representation, and 
manifestation of the different social interests they represent. They contribute 
to democratic decision-making processes by displaying what political alterna-
tives there are. The Swedish system is based on representative democracy 
and, even though the political institutions at local and regional level versus 
the national level are organised differently, they are all based on principles 
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from representative democracy. This also means that they should adhere to 
the same democratic ideals. Despite this, while national politics are seen as 
arenas for polarisation and party political conflicts, local politics are some-
times described as consensual or non-political (Karlsson, 2003). For example, 
Sanne (2001) argues that local politics is characterised by deliberation and 
joint discussions towards what is regarded as “the common good” for the mu-
nicipality as a whole. One explanation for the description of local politics as 
consensual in nature is that it has fit together with the idea of municipalities 
as “service providers” (Strandberg, 1998). In line with this interpretation of 
local politics, it is sometimes argued that local governments manage non-
political matters or administer welfare services for which decisions have 
already been made at national level (Lantto, 2005: 37ff). But even though 
local democratic practices have changed and moved away from consensual 
ideals, and instead adopted practices of majoritarian democracy, we can still 
find examples of the different norms for local and national politics. For ex-
ample, they are evident in governmental inquiries (see for example, SOU 
2000:1; SOU 2012:30; SOU 2016:5), where, as a response to the debate on 
“vitalising local politics” and to counter the risk of a “party decline”, several 
reforms aimed at developing additional forms of citizen participation and 
citizen dialogues have been suggested. Many initiatives are also being im-
plemented and citizens are now often invited to influence local politics via 
channels other than through political parties and electoral processes (Montin, 
2006). But why are there different norms for democracy at national and local 
level?  
Local governments work in close proximity to their citizens and as such it 
is often argued that this should lead to a democracy based upon widespread 
participation and dialogue between decision-makers and citizens. It is also at 
local level that most citizens engage in politics, and many local governments 
are making great efforts to organise arenas for citizen dialogues. However, in 
a decentralised welfare state such as Sweden, the same dimensions of con-
flicts that exist at national level persist at local level as well. Local gov-
ernments are responsible for provision of welfare services, but also for many 
of the decisions related to these policy areas. This includes issues such as 
privatisation, marketization, sustainability, nationalism etc. These are highly 
political matters, and it is not surprising that there are political conflicts con-
cerning these issues – regardless of tier of government. Based on the histor-
ical development of local politics over the past century, there have also been 
dramatic changes to local democratic practices. Formations in parliamentar-
ian majorities were previously an informal and imprecise practice, and broad 
coalitions where both left and right wing parties collaborated were common. 
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But over time, majoritarian democracy has been established in numerous mu-
nicipalities and the political parties now mobilise their work into a ruling and 
an oppositional side over the whole term of office. Based on earlier studies of 
representational styles, it is evident that local councillors now primarily 
regard themselves as party representatives (Gilljam et al., 2010a; Skoog, 
2011).  
As shown in the studies included in this thesis, political conflicts among 
political parties in Swedish local government are now an inevitable part of 
local democratic practices. This means that there is a discrepancy between 
the discourses suggesting local politics is void of conflicts and the practices 
of local democratic work where conflicts are a regular element. It could also 
be that disagreement and lines of conflict are concealed underneath what may 
appear to be consensus in local politics, a tendency that has been found in 
Norwegian local politics  (Aarsæther & Bjørnå, 2016). Correspondingly, ear-
lier studies have also shown that given the choice, Swedish local councillors 
favour practices based on ideals of representative democracy over participa-
tory practices (Gilljam et al., 2010b).  
Democracy is perhaps the most widely respected form of political system, 
but it is also difficult to uphold. Democratic systems are by their nature sys-
tems of institutionalised competition for power. If there is no competition and 
no conflict, there is no need for democracy. But when political conflicts are 
sanctioned, they come with the risk of growing too extreme and generating a 
society so ridden with conflict that political stability is threatened. This 
means that political leaders must encourage conflict, but still retain the ability 
to act and enforce policies. This implies a contradiction between representing 
the many and putting power in the hands of the few. Inherent within democ-
ratic systems is the tension between democratic ideals based on represen-
tation and conflict and managerial ideals of governability and ability to act 
(Diamond, 1990).  
As seen in the results of the studies included in this thesis, and as earlier 
scholars have also argued, norms related to majoritarian democracy have 
gained ground in local politics. Consequently, a gap has been created be-
tween, on the one hand, formal regulations, and on the other hand, local 
democratic practices. But is this development desirable? As was illustrated in 
section 2 of this thesis, there are various perspectives on political conflict and 
its role in a democratic system. Given these perspectives, there are a range of 
answers to this normative question. 
If one adheres to a consensual model of democracy, the adoption of ma-
jority rule in local politics may be viewed as troublesome. The focus here is 
on bridging conflicts and seeking solutions across party lines. But this does 
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not necessarily mean that political opponents should be in consensus, even if 
an exaggerated political dissent could be problematic. Instead, the importance 
of political actors striving towards cooperation in order to get as wide collab-
oration as possible could be stressed. If political actors become too focused 
on emphasising their differences, on openly critiquing political opponents, 
and on stopping other actors from exerting political influence, the ability to 
bridge political conflicts may diminish. This means that it is mainly antag-
onistic behaviour that is an obstacle to an unconditional search for political 
solutions that fit with the common good. Exaggerated political dissent could 
also be problematic, but the main focus would be on how actors handle the 
challenge of cooperating in such situations.  
For proponents of majoritarian democracy, this development may be less 
problematic. Within this model of democracy, it is important for political 
actors to display their inherent differences openly and to be clear on who is 
responsible, and if voters are dissatisfied it should be possible to elect a new 
leadership. This means that it is vital for voters to be able to differentiate 
between the ruling majority and the opposition. From this perspective, an em-
phasis on political dissent coupled with a limited amount of antagonistic be-
haviour is positive. An environment where political differences between po-
litical opponents are displayed openly is not a threat to democracy – it is a 
mechanism. However, this does not mean that an excessive amount of antag-
onistic behaviour is welcomed. If it turns ugly, grows extreme, and entails 
acts of disrespectful behaviour, this could threaten the legitimacy of the 
political system. 
But for advocates of deliberative democracy, a model of democracy that 
sometimes is argued to foster an understanding and consensual political 
climate among those who participate (Cohen, 1989; Hermansson et al., 2008; 
Gutmann & Thompson, 2009; Premfors, 2000), this development would not 
be regarded as desirable. However, in recent years the concept of consensus 
has seen a number of reformulations among deliberative democrats that are 
more compatible with political struggle and conflict (Bächtiger et al., 
2018:19ff). Conflict and the airing of disagreements are now more often 
argued to be important for decision-making processes in deliberative democ-
racy (Mansbridge et al., 2010: 69). This means that putting forth arguments, 
and counter arguments, in the public sphere is the means by which political 
decision-making in deliberative processes develops a logic that can be as-
sessed and evaluated by those who are affected by the decision (White & 
Ypi, 2011). It is thus important for participating political actors in a delib-
erative model of democracy to voice their opinions and allow for political 
dissent to be displayed openly during the process. From this it follows that it 
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is mainly antagonistic behaviour, both in an exaggerated form but perhaps 
even in a limited amount, which might be problematic. If participants are not 
open to cooperation and making compromises across political divides, this 
might risk damaging deliberative processes. 
Scholars, experts, and practitioners have argued that conflicts are either 
positive for democracy and should be embraced, or a negative feature that is 
to be rejected. Possibly both perspectives are valid, but in relation to different 
forms of political conflict. Perhaps it is political dissent, to clarify the differ-
ences in political actors’ positions on policies, which should be embraced and 
displayed openly. Dissent brings with it characteristics that are of great im-
portance to a democratic system, and as an added bonus, as shown in paper 4, 
may even serve to strengthen the influence of political actors. For those who 
adhere to a majoritarian perspective, a moderate level of antagonistic be-
haviour is a prerequisite for a functioning democracy. It may prevent exag-
gerated cooperation across party lines, which muddles voters’ chances for 
democratic accountability. An overinflated amount of antagonistic behaviour 
may create an inferior working environment for political representatives in 
the short run, while in the long run, bad conflicts can turn ugly – filling the 
political arena with acts of disrespectful behaviour which could delegitimise 
democratic institutions and the actors working within them. Democracy, re-
gardless of whether it is consensual or majoritarian in nature, must be regarded 
as legitimate in the eyes of those governed – the people. In order to uphold its 
legitimacy, it needs to manage social and economic problems, and achieve this 
while maintaining a measure of respectful behaviour for political adversaries.   
This highlights a paradox – conflict is a prerequisite for democracy, but 
conflict needs to be managed and restrained. Thus, in the words of Larry 
Diamond: “cleavage must be tempered by consensus” (Diamond, 1990). 
Herbert Tingsten was of a similar mind, arguing that: “A balance between 
community and division, between cooperation and war, is a prerequisite for a 
democratic system” (Tingsten, 1960: 90). In this perspective, political con-
flicts are a necessity for democracy, but can also be an obstruction blocking 
political actors from making compromises and from cooperating (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2009). These tensions are not easily managed, but every political 
entity striving to uphold democracy is likely to face this dilemma. This illus-
trates that there is a normative aspect to political conflicts, where they may be 
viewed as either good or bad depending on point of view. However, as the 
results of this thesis show – it may also vary depending on the form of politi-
cal conflict that is in focus.  
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The Case for Political Conflicts 
This thesis focuses on political parties in local governments, highlighting 
what conflicts are, what causes political conflicts, and what their effects are. 
However, even though its results may be of particular relevance for local 
governments, the implications of the findings are more far reaching. The re-
sults of this thesis in relation to the theory of political conflicts implies that 
there may be reason to have a nuanced view of political conflicts, where they 
may be neither always good nor bad, but where their contributions to a po-
litical system may depend on their different characteristics and on how they 
are to be managed. From this, we find three arguments in favour of political 
conflicts.  
First, it may not be possible for democratic systems to avoid political con-
flicts – or deny their existence. Political conflicts are at the core of politics. 
This rests on the democratic ideal of an inherent equality between people: that 
all people are equal and that every person has the capacity to perceive what is 
in his or her interest. Or, if we reverse the argument, that no person is superior 
to another and that no claim or interest is superior. Thus, no-one can legiti-
mately subject another person to his or her will or authority. This is the foun-
dation of democracy. When a decision is to be made, no citizen’s interest or de-
mand is to be regarded as more worthy than that of another citizen (Dahl, 2007; 
Mansbridge et al., 2010). 
In any given society, there are a plethora of interests that may be in conflict 
with the interests of others. But shying away from and concealing political con-
flict will obscure the chances of openly displaying political alternatives, and 
when lines of conflict are disguised, there is a risk that not all interests are 
given equal consideration before a decision is made. When only some interests 
are to be taken into account, it raises the question of whose interests are 
deemed to be more deserving than others of such consideration. Such a situa-
tion might, in extreme cases, entail a rejection of the democratic principle of an 
inherent equality between people.  
If we are to fully accept the idea of an inherent equality, that within a 
demos we will find different interests which may conflict with the interests of 
others and that all interests have a rightful claim to be given equal consider-
ation, then we must also accept that there are political conflicts that by defini-
tion lack rational solutions. Politics almost always involves a choice between 
conflicting alternatives, where a decision may lead to a favouring of one in-
terest over another. It is not always possible to base solutions to political con-
flicts on reason or ‘common sense’, or to reduce them to technical issues best 
handled by professionals. Solutions or outcomes of political decisions can, 
however, be the result of discussions or compromises where each political actor 
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is made aware of the consequences of each choice (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2009). As conflicts also have productive qualities, such as preventing tunnel vi-
sion and spurring innovation, attempting to avoid conflict might also mean 
loosing out on reaping their benefits. 
Second, if we accept that political conflicts are a part of politics, then we 
must also allow issues to be politicised. People are not isolated individuals, 
we live together in societies and we form both individual and collective iden-
tities. These identities have a vital function in politics, where establishing an 
identity is to distinguish oneself from another and to define group boundaries 
is to make a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, thus paving the way for plu-
ralism and diversity. The role for democracy is not to overcome this in order 
to establish consensus, it is to shape these identities in such a way that con-
flicts between collectives can be managed legitimately (Dahl, 2007). 
For centuries it has been argued that democracy required a small and ho-
mogenous demos to function. But many modern democracies are large-scale, 
heterogeneous, pluralistic and diverse, proving that homogeneity is not a pre-
requisite for democracy (Dahl, 2007). However, in order to mobilise the citi-
zenry to engage in politics, issues need to be politicised, and in turn, politi-
cisation requires the social world to be allowed to appear divided into opposite 
camps to which people can associate. In an era where much is said about con-
sensus and disregarding conflicts, it is no wonder that citizens are less engaged 
in politics (Mouffe, 2008). However, in order to take a stand on political issues 
and to engage in politics, it would be beneficial if political issues were po-
larised and political alternatives were offered during political discussions or 
debates. Whether it should be the role of political parties to politicise issues, or 
whether arenas should be organised where citizens can discuss different sides 
to a policy may vary depending on the model of democracy to which one ad-
heres. But when a people actively engage in the democratic idea, this usually 
leads to the best possible political system (Dahl, 2007). If we instead were to 
refuse the chance to politicise issues, how can the people then be expected to 
take a stand on political issues, to engage in politics, if they find it difficult to 
grasp what political alternatives there are? If there is no space given to debate 
political issues, they have instead become depoliticised, which could be a threat 
to the democratic quality of policy-making (Wolf & Van Dooren, 2018). 
Third, if we accept that political conflicts are a part of politics and that 
this involves sanctioning polarisation, then – in order to be perceived as legit-
imate – there is a need for political conflicts to take on a form that does not 
threaten to eradicate political stability. To acknowledge the conflictual nature 
of the social world is not to undermine democracy, on the contrary, it is 
through such efforts that we can manage the challenges faced by democratic 
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systems (Mouffe, 2008). In order to mobilise the citizenry in a democratic 
direction, conflicts must be allowed legitimate forms of expressions. This 
could be achieved through political dissent between political parties, but it 
could also be accomplished through forums for deliberations or via participa-
tory mechanisms, and in order to stop bad conflicts from turning ugly, an-
tagonistic behaviour must be tamed and political adversaries at all levels of 
society need to learn to acknowledge and respect each other, to regard politi-
cal rivals as opponents – not enemies. When there is a lack of legitimate out-
lets for political conflicts, they can turn ugly or even violent. Through a func-
tioning democratic system where political conflicts are sanctioned and given 
legitimate forms of expressions, ugly conflicts such as excessive antagonistic 
behaviour may be tempered. Democracy, in this sense, is a mechanism that 
can be used to establish a political culture where people are encouraged to 
engage in politics, and where political conflicts are endorsed but held within 
carefully defined boundaries. 
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